ARVIND SINGH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench " A ", Bombay (for short " the Tribunal "), has arisen in the following circumstances : Udaipur State known as Mewar was an Indian State prior to the independence of the country in 1947. After the Independence Act, 1947, the United State of Rajasthan was formed and with effect from that very date, the very said State of Udaipur known as Mewar was integrated along with other Indian States into the United State of Rajasthan. A covenant was entered into between the Government of India and the said integrated State including Mewar (State of Udaipur). The covenant was signed by the Maharana of Mewar, Maharaja Bhupal Singh, and according to that covenant, the said Maharana of Mewar was to be paid an annual privy purse of Rs. 10,00,000. The said covenant has been submitted as annexure A. We may reproduce article XI of the Covenant, annexure A, which is as under ;

(2.) MAHARANA Bhupal Singh ji died in 1955. The President of India, in exercise of his political power under Article 366(22) of the Constitution recognised MAHARANA Bhagwat Singh as the MAHARANA of Mewar so as to entitle him to the privy purse payable under the said covenant. Junior Raj-mata late Smt. Gulab Kunwar of Udiapur was the step-mother and was being regularly paid by said MAHARANA Bhagwat Singh a sum of Rs. 36,000 per year as " Hath Kharch Allowance ". This amount was paid in the first year. In the second year, the amount paid was Rs. 25,500. The deceased-assessee (Junior Rajmata Smt. Gulab Kunwar) was paid the said allowance at the rate of Rs. 3,000 per month up to August, 1970, and at the rate of Rs. 1,500 per month from September, 1970, onwards. The assessment years involved are 1970-71 and 1971-72.

(3.) AFTER carefully examining the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated April 27, 1976, and the controversial points arising therefrom, we consider it proper to reframe the question formulated by the Tribunal before answering it so as to bring out the real issue between the parties. Learned counsel for the Revenue did not question the proposition that it is open to this court, without raising new and different questions, to resettle or reframe the questions formulated by the Tribunal, before answering them so that the real controversy between the parties may find place in it. In our opinion, the following question arises for our consideration in this case :