MAHARAJA GAJ SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE three appeals have been filed against the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 30 -9 -1978 disposing of 4 writ petition filed by the appellant, Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur. As common questions of law have been raised in these three appeals, it would be proper to dispose them of by a common order.

(2.) THE undisputed facts are that the father of the appellant was the erstwhile Ruler of former State of Jodhpur. In the year 1949 the then Jodhpur State integrated with other princely States to form the United State of Rajasthan. At the time of merger of the former State of Jodhpur with the other States, a covenant was entered into by the father of the appellant as the Ruler of the covenating State and the Union of India, wherein amongst other things it was provided that the ex -Ruler shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him at the time of making over of the administration of the State to the Union. Some agricultural lands, besides other immovable and movable properties were included in the list of private properties agreed upon between the ex -Ruler and the Union Government. After the death of Maharaj Hanwant Singh, the appellant inherited the properties which were declared to be his private properties, including agricultural lands and continued to remain in possession of such lands as the landholder thereof. With a view to require the 2 lands held by the Ex -rulers by the former princely States, the Rajasthan Land Reform (Acquisition of Land Owners' Estate) Act, (here in after referred to as 'the Act') was enacted. Under Section 6(2) of the Act, khatedari rights were conferred on the Ex -rulers in respect of such lands which were in their personal cultivation on the date of vesting.

(3.) IT was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant in these appeals that the learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that the third paragraph of the impugned notices was severable. According to the learned Counsel, the entire notices formed an integrated whole and as such the notices given by the Sub -divisional Officers sought to have been completely quashed and the remaining parts thereof, namely, the other two paragraphs could not have been held as valid even though the third paragraph of the notices was quashed by the learned Single Judge. Thus, the only argument which has been advanced in these appeals relate to the question of severability of the third paragraph of the impugned notices from the remaining two paragraphs.