PRAHHASHANKER Vs. RUKMANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit filed by Kanhaiyalal (since deceased) and his brother Vasudeo to eject the tenant defendant, who is appellant in this appeal.

(2.) THE suit was filed on 11-10-71 when the provisions of the Rajasthan Pre-mises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, were in force. Both the lower courts took the view that the land-lords required the demised premises bona fide and reasonably for their own occupation and for the occupation of their family members. THE courts below therefore decreed the suit for ejectment in favour of Vasudeo and the legal representatives of Kanhaiyalal who died during the pendency of the suit in trial court. THE tenant has preferred this second appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal in the Court, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was amended by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ordinance No. 26 of 1975), hereinafter called as the Amendment Ordinance of 1975, on 29-9-75.

(3.) THERE is yet another aspect of the case. The words "no decree for eviction. . . . . . . . . shall be passed" used in sec. 14 (2) are clearly suggestive of unmistakable indication of the legislative intention to make this sub section retrospective, the reason being that it prohibits the passing of a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in sec. 13 (1) (h) unless the question of comparative hardship has been examined by the court. In other words, sec. 14 (2) as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1975 must inevitably come into play for the benefit of the tenant in the pending suits as also in the pending appeals since it is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. If the legislature had intended that the provisions of sec. 14 (2) should operate prospectively, it would not have used the words "no decree. . . . . . . . . shall be passed", but instead used the language "no suit for eviction. . . . . . . . . . . . shall be passed against the tenant" as used in sub sec. (3) of sec. 14 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1975. I am, therefore, of the opinion that no prospective operation to sec. 14 (2) can be given without doing violence to its language. I, therefore, hold that the provisions of sec. 14 (2) as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1975 and pending suits and also pending appeals based on the ground under sec. 13 (1) (h) have retrospective effect and would be governed by sec 14 (2) of the Act as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1975. Since sec. 14 (2; prohibits only passing of a decree for eviction, the provisions of sec. 14 (2) as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1975 shall have no effect to execution proceedings pending in the executing courts wherein the decrees have been passed against the tenants on the ground under sec. 13 (1) (h) of the Act,