SURESHCHANDRA Vs. BIRDICHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are two connected appeals and are both directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 18th August, 1964 by which, on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by 13 electors of Kotputli municipality, the learned Judge set aside the elections and co-options of the members of Kotputli municipality who were elected or co-opted as a result of the general, election held in 1964. D. B. Special Appeal 21 of 1964 is by sureshchandra and others, whose election or co-option was set aside and appeal no. 33 of 1964 is by the State of Rajasthan, the Collector and the Returning officer. They can conveniently be disposed of together.

(2.) THE sole ground on which the learned Judge held the election to be void was that the notification issued by the Government, dated 26th November, 1963 for inviting objections against the proposed delimitation of the wards did not conform to the mandatory requirements of Section 14 (2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), inasmuch as at least one month was not given to the electors to file their objections against the draft delimination order. The learned Judge in taking the view which he did followed his earlier decision in Ram Krishna v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 Raj LW 121. The only point that, therefore, arises for our consideration is whether the notification dated 26th November, 1963 fulfilled the requirements of Section 14 (2) of the Act and whether Ram Krishna's case which was followed by the learned Judge laid down the law correctly. Section 14 of the Act runs as under:

(3.) THE problem before us centres round a proper interpretation of the words "within a period of not less than one month" occurring in Sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act reproduced above. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that for determining as to whether a particular period fixed in a given case is not less than one month, the date on which the notification is issued is to be excluded, but the date on which the period of one month is to end, is not to be excluded. On the other hand it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that at least one month should intervene between the date of the notification and the last date on which the prescribed period is to terminate. In other words, it is urged that for a period to be "not less than one month" within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, clear one month must intervene and this can be brought about only when both the date on which the notification is issued and the date upto which the objections are to be filed, are excluded.