JAGANNATH Vs. PANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Both these appeals involve a common question of law and fact and hence will be disposed of by this judgment.

(2.) Put briefly the fact of the case are that Rampal Khatedar entered into two contracts of sale for his land for khasra No. 1001/85 and 99 measuring 37 bighas 5 biswas with Panna and Dhanna sons of Raghunath Dhakad and for khasra No. 89 measuring 35 bighas 2 biswas with Nathulal son of Ramchandra Dhakad. On Chait Sudi 7 Svt. 2007 (26th March,1950). This contract of sale was embodied in two documents (Ex. P. 1 in each case). Subsequently on 29 -6 -50 Rampal transferred by sale the entire land comprised in the above two contracts of sale in favour of one Jagannath. This Jagannath instituted two separate suits against both the parties, who had entered into a contract of sale with Rampal, in the court of the S.D.O. Chhabra for recovery of possession with the allegations that the plaintiffs acquired possession over the land in dispute on 19 -4 -50 through a registered sale deed (Ex. P.1 in each case), that on 26 -7 -50 he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendants and as the defendants had no lawful authority to obtain possession they should be dispossessed, possession being restored to plaintiffs. The trial court decreed the suits* The defendants filed separate appeals before the lower appellate court - -Divisional Commissioner, Kotah - -who by his judgment dated 16 -11 -54 allowed the appeals and reversed the decrees of the trials. The plaintiff has filed these two separate appeals against the same.

(3.) We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have examined the records as well. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that an agreement to sell an immovable property does not create any interest in the said property unless a sale deed is executed conveying the said property. The vendor who has not transferred his interest in the property, though the entered into an agreement with another to sell the same can certainly confer title on a third party by executing a sale deed in his favour A.I.R. 1953 Madras 409 has been cited in support of this proposition. The ruling however has no much applicability to the present case. These considerations would certainly have been material if the plaintiff had claimed relief on the basis of his title alleged to have been acquired by him through a sale. The present suit is not based on title but upon possession and subsequent wrongful disposse -ssion by the defendants. Thus the only question which we are called upon to decide in the case is as to whether the appellant was actually put in possession or not over the land in dispute.