AMBALAL Vs. JAGANNATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against an appellate order of the Additional Commissioner, Udaipur, dated 3-2-55 whereby the appeal filed before him by Jagannath, respondent, was held within limitation under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.

(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record as well. It is true that an appellate court is to exercise its own discretion while dealing with the question as to whether a "sufficient cause" for the delay under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act exists or not. But it is a general principle of law that discretionary power must be exercised on judicial principles and not "in any arbitrary vague or fanciful manner. " The term "sufficient cause" has not been defined anywhere in the Indian Limitation Act, but it has been held that it must mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section. Necessarily it follows that a case for delay which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot constitute a sufficient cause. In the present cases, we find that Jagannath respondent, in the last party of the memorandum of appeal presented by him before the lower appellate court disclosed the following facts - "as regards the limitation for appeal the facts are that I proceeded to Kumbh-ka-Mela and after that to Shri Jagannath, Shri Rameshwar, Shri Dwarka, Gaya, Ayodhya etc. sacred places. From there I returned in the beginning of June The two months' period continued up to 13th June. I was laid up with enteric fever. From 10-6-54 became completely unable to walk and remained under treatment upto 23rd June and on 24th June, doctor advised me to refrain from movements till 10/12 days On 29-6-54, I applied for a copy of the judgment of lower court which was delivered to me on 3-7-54 and I presented the appeal on this very date. " Evidently, Jagannath did not mention the date or dates on which he proceeded to the various placets, though he has given a formidable list of the places he visited in his connection. The date on which he actually returned to his residence after pilgrimage is also deliberately avoided and the only thing stated is that it was the beginning of June. That it Is evident that Jagannath had no excuse for allowing the entire period of limitation to go by without even applying for a copy of the judgment or taking steps for filing his appeal. As observed by Dawson-Miller, C. J. ". . . . . . . . . One is not entitled to put things off to the last time. There is always the chapter of accidents to be considered, and seems to me that one ought to consider that some accident or other might happen which will delay them in carrying out that part of their duties for which the court prescribes a time limit, and if they choose to rely upon everything going absolutely and with till the very last moment, I think they have only themselves to blame if they should find that something has happened which was unexpected but which ought to be reckoned with and are not entitled in such circumstances to the indulgence of the court. " When the period for appeal has expired a valuable right is secured to the opposite party and there ought to exist sufficient ground before the successful litigant is deprived of the advantages which have already accrued to him thereby. No such ground has been shown to exist in the present case. The lower appellate court was, therefore, clearly unjustified in exercising its discretion in the manner it did and the order passed by it cannot be upheld. WE would, therefore, allow the appeal,set aside the order of the lower appellate court and direct that the appeal presented before it by Jagannath shall be rejected on the ground of limitation. .