JETDAN Vs. BAKSHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a reference by the learned Collector, Sikar, under sec. 28 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951. Put briefly the facts of the case are that Baksha etc., plaintiffs, instituted a suit against Gokalram etc. defendants, in the court of the S.D.O. Fatehpur on 30.10.54 for a right of way and an injunction. It was averred in the plaint that the defendants were interfering with the plaintiff right of way to well in khasra No.l17 and field in khasra No.l19. The prayer in the plaint was for declaration that the plaintiffs had a right of way through khasra Nos.l17 & 118 to their well and field in khasra No. 119 for removal of the obstructions placed by the defendants in the way and for the grant for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with right of way. The plaintiffs applied for the grant of temporary injunction. The trial court granted an interim injunction alone with the issue of notice to the defendant to show cause against the same. The defendants applied before the learned Collector on 17.11.54 for reference being made to the Board under sec. 28 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure & Jurisdiction) Act. The learned Collector has in his order of reference stated that "In view of the fact that the plaintiffs suit is for permanent of reference and not made under item 25 Group B, Schedule I of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure & Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, the S.D.O. Fatehpur has no jurisdiction to entertain such suit in accordance with the ruling quoted above."

(2.) The learned Collector seems to have overlooked the provisions of sec. 18 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act. The order which is alleged to be without jurisdiction could have been challenged in appeal before him and it is not understood as to why a reference was considered necessary when a clear provision for appeal exists in law. It would have been open to the learned Collector to decide the appeal as he thought best and if any party felt aggrieved by it he could have come up in second appeal before the Board. The reference is therefore,, liable to be rejected on this ground alone. But as the order of reference passed by the Collector reveals some wrong notions about the law on the subject, I would examine it in some detail. As observed above the main reliefs claimed in the plaint were two, one relating to a right of way to ones well and field, and the other to the grant of a permanent injuction. It is perfectly correct that a suit for a mere permanent injunction is beyond the cognizance of a Revenue Court as laid down by the Rajasthan High Court in 1952 R.L.W. page 248. But the present case is not merely for a permanent injunction. It seeks two reliefs The main relief relates to the right of way to ones well and field. The principle that will govern the jurisdiction of courts in such cases has been set out at length by Shri Wanchoo, C.J. in 1953 RLW. 332. It has been observed therein that "once the cause of action is such that a suit can be brought in the revenue court on the basis of it and some relief obtained, the suit must be filed in the revenue court even though it nifty be possible to ask for greater or additional or some different relief from the civil court. Thus the Rajasthan Act is more strongly in favour of the jurisdiction of the revenue court than is the case with the U.P. Act, and where therefore a case comes under one of the items in the schedule to the Rajasthan Act, and is based on a cause of action arising under any of these, items, the suit must be filed in revenue court. It is immaterial whether by filing the suit in the civil court the plaintiff might be able to ask for a relief greater than, or additional to or not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted. He has to file the suit in the revenue court view of this explanation, and, of course, if he asks for something which the revenue court is not in a position to give him, the revenue court will only give him that relief which could be granted to him under the provisions of Act I of 1951 read with the various rent and revenue laws of the various covenanting States." By applying this test it becomes abundantly clear that the main relief sought in the case is such as can be granted by a revenue court and the suit must therefore, lie only in the revenue court which will of course grant only that relief which could be granted to him under the provisions of the law. The reference is therefore incompetent and is hereby rejected.