BHANWAR LAL Vs. MST. MANGI BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by Bhanwarlal in a case under 'the Indian Succession Act. It came up before a learned Single Judge for decision, and as the points involved were of great importance and complexity, he referred the case to a larger Bench.

(2.) THE facts, which led to this appeal may be briefly narrated. One Kishanlal was a flourishing business man and died in Kuchaman on 8 -1 -1952. An application was made on 14 -10 -1952 by his widow Mst. Mangibai for grant of succession certificate with respect to certain monies due to Kishanlal which were lying in certain banks. A little later, on the 6 -12 -1952, the present appellant Bhanwarlal also made an application for grant of succession certificate claiming to be the adopted son of Kishanlal deceased. He also filed objections to the grant of succession certificate to Shrimati Mangibai on the ground that he being the adopted son had a preferential claim. The two application's were tried together by the Senior Civil Judge, Merta. There is no dispute that Shrimati Mangibai is the widow of Kishanlal. There was, however, serious dispute to the claim of Bhanwarlal to be the adopted, son of Kishanlal deceased. Evidence, therefore, was led by both parties on the question of adoption. The trial Court, however, did not go into all the evidence, and addressed itself to the question whether there was a registered deed of adoption in favour of Bhanwarlal or not.

(3.) SO far as the first contention, namely that the trial Court was wrong in holding that the document which appeared in the registration books as having been registered by Kishanlal in 1943 was not genuine, and that there was therefore no prima facie proof that Kishanlal ever executed a registered adoption deed in favour of Bhanwarlal, may be shortly disposed of. We have seen the document in question in the registration books, and have heard all that learned counsel for the appellant had to say against the judgment of the trial Court on this question. We think it unnecessary to repeat what the trial Court has said in coming to the conclusion that that particular document in the Registration books was a forgery, and was introduced into the books by fraud, and was never genuinely registered by the proper registering authority. The trial Court has given cogent reasons for coming to this conclusion, and it is sufficient for us to say that we agree with these reasons, and have no hesitation in holding that the document appearing in the registration books of 1943 was introduced there by some kind of fraud, and was never really registered by the proper registering officer.