HARBAJAN SINGH Vs. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The matter at hand is one of uncommon factual contour and legal complexity. It revolves around a set of circumstances, both peculiar and legally significant.

(2.) The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails the penultimate part of the operative paragraph of order dtd. 10/10/2003 (Annexure-3) passed by the Disciplinary Authority, to the extent that the period during which the petitioner remained in judicial custody from 21/8/2000 to 1/8/2002 shall be treated as period of absence and shall be regularised as leave without pay. The petitioner has sought indulgence of this court with following prayer:

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was holding post of Constable in the Police Department. He was arrested on 21/8/2000 and sent in judicial custody pursuant to one FIR lodged for committing alleged offences punishable under Ss. 306 and 376 IPC and Ss. 3(1) (12) and 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Consequent upon his arrest, he was also suspended on 21/8/2000 by the competent authority in exercise of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1958') and departmental enquiry was also initiated against him vide charge sheet dtd. 16/4/2001. After undergoing a full-fledged trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the competent criminal court vide judgment dtd. 1/8/2002. After acquittal, his suspension from the post of Constable was also revoked on 11/9/2002. Petitioner underwent enquiry in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 and vide order dtd. 10/10/2003, the Disciplinary Authority exonerated the petitioner of all departmental charges and in the penultimate part of the operative paragraph held that he was entitled to all pay and allowances for the period of suspension (21/8/2000 to 11/9/2002) and that the suspension period shall be counted for all purposes in government service. Notwithstanding that clear direction, the penultimate part of the same operative paragraph treats the period 21/8/2000 to 1/8/2002 (the period of judicial custody) as period of absence and converts it into leave without pay. As per the petitioner, it is this manifestly inconsistent and punitive limb of order dtd. 10/10/2003, which is causing miscarriage of justice and grave prejudice to him. The petitioner challenges only the latter limb of the aforesaid order which denies pay for the period when he was in judicial custody.