STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. Vs. DHAPU BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appeal is barred by limitation from 52 days. Two other defects have also been pointed out by the Registry and those too have not been removed by the appellant State of Rajasthan. Ignoring the defects pointed out by the Registry, we have examined merits of the appeal.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, facts of the case are that husband of respondent -petitioner Smt. Dhapu Bai was in employment of the State of Rajasthan as Patwari. He was subjected to disciplinary action and was removed from service under an order dated 01.5.1985. The appeal preferred by him as per provisions of Section 23 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1958') also came to be rejected under an order dated 29.11.1985. To question correctness of the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, husband of the respondent -petitioner preferred a petition for writ, being SBCWP No. 431/1986 (Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.), which came to be accepted by learned Single Bench of this Court on 18.11.1996. The learned Single Bench accepted the writ petition by relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar reported in : JT 1993 (6) SC 1 by accepting the fact that before imposing penalty of dismissal from service, a report of enquiry was not supplied to him. The learned Single Bench set aside the order dated 29.11.1985 passed by the appellate authority and left it open for the disciplinary authority to supply a copy of enquiry report to the delinquent government servant, the government servant was at liberty to furnish his explanation and to file fresh appeal before the appellate authority.

(3.) BEFORE us while pressing this appeal, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant -respondent that the learned Single Bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 431/1986 set aside the order passed by the appellate authority, therefore, the order of disciplinary authority was very much in existence, hence, husband of the respondent -petitioner is required to be treated as an employee dismissed from service and not as an existing government servant. It is asserted that being not an existing government servant on the date of death, no post -death cum retiral benefits could have been granted to the respondent -petitioner being wife of government servant, who suffered dismissal under the order dated 01.5.1989.