DHARAMCHAN & ORS. Vs. RAMGOPAL & ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By order dated 26.8.2002 Civil Judge (S.D.), Sambhar Lake passed an order under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short the Act of 1950) in Civil Eviction Case No. 87/95 titled as Malkhu Devi v. Ramgopal to the effect that delay in payment of rent for the period of April-May 1991and May-June 1991 as well as delay in deposit of rent of the period of 22.5.1993 to 5.9.1994 by the tenant deserves to be condoned and was accordingly condoned by that court.

(2.) The said order dated 26.8.2002 was challenged by the land-lord in the court of Additional District Judge, Sambhar Lake in Civil Misc. Appeal No.15/2002 which was decided by that court on 8.9.2006 and the order dated 26.8.2002 was upheld by that court also. The appellate court followed Full Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court in Sita Ram v. Nasiruddin - (1998) 1 WLC Raj. 825. Against the appellate Court's order dated 8.9.2006 land-lords plaintiffs Dharamchand and Ors. have filed this revision petition in which it has been submitted that the courts below have wrongly relied upon an over-ruled ruling of Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court because the said judgment of the Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court had already been set aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal - (2003) 2 SCC 577 i.e. before the judgment by the first appellate court.

(3.) I have gone through the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment referred above. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court had erred in allowing tenants' revision petition on the finding that application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was maintainable. Apex Court has also held that the deposit of rent by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be applied where the default takes place in complying with an order under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950. It was further held that the court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the court and not otherwise. Following other rulings have also been referred by the appellants in this regard;