GHISHULAL Vs. BADAAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER -defendant has preferred this revision petition under Section 115 CPC assailing the impugned order dated 30th November, 2013 passed by the learned District Judge, Chittorgarh, whereby his application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in civil regular first appeal is dismissed.

(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that respondent -plaintiff instituted a civil suit against the petitioner -defendant for perpetual injunction not to cause any disturbance in the suit property, which is owned by him and in his possession. The suit is contested by the petitioner and after conclusion of the trial, learned Additional Civil Judge, Chittorgarh (learned trial Court) decreed the suit on 19th February, 2010. When the decree was put to execution by the respondent -plaintiff under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC, notices were issued to the petitioner and same were served on him on 6th January, 2012. After service of notice, reply was filed by the petitioner on 17th April, 2012 duly supported by his affidavit. When execution proceedings were going on, the petitioner -defendant filed first appeal before the learned District Judge, Chittorgarh (appellate Court). As the appeal was presented after delay of more than three years, petitioner also made endeavour for condonation of delay and separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed. For seeking condonation of delay, petitioner has averred following facts, which are clearly discernible from Annex.R/2 produced on behalf of the respondent with his reply to the stay petition: -

(3.) MR . V.K. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that, while considering application for condonation of delay, appellate Court is required to construe term 'sufficient cause' liberally for advancing the cause of justice. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel would contend that, while rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, learned Court below has taken too technical view in construing the sufficient cause, and therefore, the order impugned suffers from vice of serious jurisdictional error. Mr. Agarwal further submits that the learned appellate Court, while rejecting the application for condonation of delay, has committed illegality and material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction, and therefore, impugned order is liable to be interfered with. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on following decisions: -