RAKESH GUPTA Vs. DEEPAK BHARGAVA & OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Rent Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter 'the Appellate Tribunal') vide its judgment dated 4-10-2013 reversed the judgment dated 24-4-2009 passed by the Rent Tribunal (hereinafter 'the Tribunal') dismissing the respondent-applicant's (hereinafter 'the applicant') eviction petition under Section 9 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter 'the 2001 Act'). The Appellate Tribunal held that the petitioner-non-applicant (hereinafter 'the non-applicant') was liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises on the ground of the bonafide and reasonable requirement of the applicant in respect of the tenanted premises. Hence this petition.

(2.) Mr. Reashm Bhargava, Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the judgment passed by the Appellate Tribunal is perverse to the evidence on record. The requirement of the applicant was neither bonafide nor reasonable, and there was no basis to upset the conclusions of the Rent Tribunal dismissing the eviction petition. It was submitted that the applicant had admittedly purchased the tenanted premises on 11-7-2003 from the erstwhile landlord Smt.Geeta Devi by a registered sale-deed. However he approached the Rent Tribunal only in the year 2005 and had the applicant any bonafide and reasonable requirement for the tenanted premises, he would have earlier laid the eviction petition. Counsel for the non-applicant further submitted that the applicant also had accommodation in the vicinity of the tenanted premises, which was sufficient for his business requirements. And the eviction of the non-applicant as sought was a mere desire. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indrasen Jain Vs. Rameshwar Das, 2005 AIR(SCW) 115 to submit that where purchase of the tenanted premises by the landlord was followed by a hiatus of about two years in laying an eviction petition with regard thereto it was by itself evidence of the requirement for the suit premises being only a sham and not bonafide and reasonable. It was further submitted that the eviction petition was rightly dismissed by the Tribunal for reason of the applicant's requirement not being bonafide as he had not approached the Tribunal with full material disclosure such as the availability of two rooms adjacent to the tenanted premises sufficient otherwise for his requirement. It was submitted that the Appellate Tribunal interfered with the findings of the Tribunal set aside the dismissal of the eviction petition on the unsustainable ground that the evidence of the non-applicant with regard to accommodation adjacent to the tenanted premises was without any pleading with regard thereto in the eviction petition and affidavit in evidence and hence could not be admissible. Counsel finally submitted that a reading of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal indicates that it had first come to a peremptory conclusion about the applicant's bonafide and reasonable requirement only thereafter set out reasons therefor.

(3.) Per contra, Mr. Mahendra Goyal, counsel for the applicant has submitted that the Appellate Tribunal being the final court of fact under the 2001 Act had the jurisdiction to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence laid before the Tribunal. It was submitted that from the evidence the Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the judgment of the Tribunal negating the applicant's reasonable and bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises was wholly de hors the evidence on record, conjectural and based on surmises, more so with the Tribunal unnecessarily venturing into questions such as the comparative suitability of tenanted premises for the applicant's business vis-a-vis his existing business from a rented shop near the bus-stand on the main road. Counsel pointed out that the Appellate Tribunal has rightly held, in terms of the well settled law that the applicant landlord was the best judge to determine the suitability of a premises for his business. Counsel then submitted that the Appellate Tribunal has also rightly held that the premises from where the applicant was then doing his business of manufacture/ repair of shock-absorbers was only 10ft x 8ft, whereas the tenanted premises from which the non-applicant's eviction was sought was 10.6 ft. X 24 ft. Further the Tribunal in dismissing the eviction petition had overlooked a fundamental tenet relating to admissibility of evidence, i.e. a party could not be allowed to lead evidence beyond its pleadings, as the non-applicant did in asserting for the first time in his cross-examination that the applicant had two vacant rooms adjacent to the tenanted premises which were adequate for his requirement. It was submitted that the said fact was neither set out in the tenant's reply to the eviction petition nor even asserted in the affidavits in evidence of the non-applicant. It was submitted that in the circumstances it cannot even remotely be argued that the findings by the Appellate Tribunal with regard to the applicant's bonafide and reasonable requirement for the tenanted premises was perverse to the evidence on record or that while coming to such a conclusion the Appellate Tribunal did not deal with the reasonings of the Tribunal. Counsel finally submitted that merely because the applicant purchased the tenanted premises in the year 2003 and laid the eviction petition before the Tribunal about two years thereafter, this fact by itself could not negate his bonafide and reasonable necessity for the premises in dispute. It was submitted that the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal is a well considered determination of the issue of bonafide and reasonable necessity on a cogent and objective analysis of evidence on record and merely because the conclusions of the Appellate Tribunal preceeded the reasoning by it, itself cannot entail the judgment being set aside.