GANPAT TIWARI Vs. SURAJ SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28. 3. 1994 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur City, Jaipur by which the claim petition has been dismissed treating it to be time barred.

(2.) BRIEF facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that on 6. 6. 1992 at about 9 am opposite to M/s. Shakeel Meat House, Parivahan Marg, Jaipur deceased Jagdish Tiwari became victim of an accident because of rash and negligent driving of tempo No. RNQ 9545 driven by Suraj Singh-respondent No. 1. The deceased Jagdish Tiwari died due to fatal injuries sustained in the accident. After the said accident the driver of the tempo involved in the accident ran away along with his tempo from the spot. Case was registered under Sections 279 & 304-A IPC. During the investigation, the claimants preferred the claim under Section 161 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the Act, 1988) under the special provisions as to get compensation in case of hit and run motor accident. Thereafter, charge-sheet had been filed against Suraj Singh-respondent No. 1. On this, the claim petition was filed by the claimants-heir of the deceased on 4. 11. 1993 under Section 168 of the Act, 1988. Treating it as time barred the claim petition was dismissed.

(3.) I have considered the rival contentions and perused the record. It is not disputed that in this matter accident took place on 6. 6. 1992 while the claim petition was filed under Section 168 of the Act, 1988 on 4. 11. 1993 much after the expiry of a period of one year. At the time of accident and filing of the claim petition provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 166 were applicable by which maximum period of one year has been prescribed which reads as under :- " No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. "