TRILOK SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE abovementioned two writ petitions are being decided by this common order as in both of them common question of law is involved. FACTS OF WRIT PETITION NO. 6199/2003 This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the respondents on 29. 10. 2003 with the prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the order dtd. 8. 10. 1998 (Annex. 10) passed by the respondent No. 2 (Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur) by which the appeal filed by the petitioner, was dismissed and order dtd. 25. 7. 1997 (Annex. 7) passed by the respondent No. 3 (the Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur) by which the punishment of censure was imposed on the petitioner be quashed and set aside.

(2.) THE case of the petitioner as putforward by him in this writ petition is as follows: THE petitioner entered in the services of Government of Rajasthan being appointed as Mechanic in the Rajasthan Police Motor Transport workshop, Jodhpur through order dtd. 28. 6. 1994. THE further case of the petitioner is that the State Government by order dtd. 19. 4. 1996 closed down the Police Motor Transport Workshop at Jodhpur and Bikaner and as a consequence of closure of the said workshop, through order dtd. 25. 1. 1997 (Annex. 1), the petitioner was declared surplus and he was relieved by the Police Department and was placed under the control of General Administration for absorption. Further case of the petitioner is that on 6. 5. 1997, the petitioner filed a joint representation before the respondent No. 2 (THE Dy. Inspector General of Police), Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur) for redressal of his grievance and a similar representation was made to his Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan requesting for his absorption. Further case of the petitioner is that on the representation submitted by him, through order dtd. 5. 7. 1997 (Annex. 4), the petitioner and other similarly situated employees were absorbed in the Motor Transport wing of the Police Department at Jodhpur. THE further case of the petitioner is that in pursuance of order dtd. 5. 7. 1997 (Annex. 4), the petitioner joined the duties on 8. 7. 1997 and immediately after joining, he was served a notice dated 9. 7. 1997 (Annex. 5) under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1958) initiating enquiry against the petitioner on the ground that on 6. 5. 1997, he had made a joint representation to the respondent No. 2 (Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur) and his Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan which was in contravention of the Rules as it tantamount to unionism which is not permissible in disciplined forces. Further case of the petitioner is that he submitted reply dtd. 17. 7. 1997 (Annex. 6) to the notice dtd. 9. 7. 1997 (Annex. 5 ). Further case of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3 (Superintendent of Police) through order dtd. 25. 7. 1997 (Annex. 7) imposed punishment of censure on the petitioner. Further case of the petitioner is that against the order dtd. 25. 7. 1997 (Annex. 7), he preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 2 (Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur) and the respondent No. 2 through order dtd. 8. 10. 1998 (Annex. 10) dismissed the same. Hence, this writ petition with the abovementioned prayer. A reply to the writ petition was filed by the respondents and their case is that impugned orders dtd. 25. 7. 1997 (Annex. 7) and 8. 10. 1998 (Annex. 10) were rightly passed and no interference is called for in the impugned orders (Annex. 7 and 10) and hence, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

(3.) THIS Court in the case of Man Shankar Lohar (supra), has observed as under: " From the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is evident that the petitioner stood relieved from the Police Department on 25. 1. 1997 and he was put under the control of General Administration. The alleged misconduct of making a joint representation was committed by him on 6. 5. 1997 and the petitioner had reallocated and absorbed in the Police Department vide order dtd. 5. 7. 1997 (Annex. 4 ). Thus, it is clear that on the date of commission of alleged misconduct i. e. , making of joint representation, the petitioner was not an employee of the Police Department. I failed to understand as to how the police authorities could exercise their power under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules, 1958 for the alleged misconduct which was committed on a date when the petitioner was not in Police Department. There can be no dispute that it is a settled legal proposition that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated either by the appointing authority or by the disciplinary authority or by the controlling authority. On the date of alleged misconduct, the respondents No. 2 and 3 were none of the above. Therefore, without entering into merit of the issue, whether making a joint representation to his Excellency the Governor for redressal of their grievance amounts to union activities or not, I am of the view that as the alleged misconduct was committed on a date when the petitioner was not a police personnel, the respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to initiate the disciplinary proceedings for the said alleged misconduct and the order is without jurisdiction thus, nullity. The appellate order also remains inconsequential. Even if the petitioner had made a representation jointly to the respondent No. 2, it would not change the position for the reason that the respondent No. 2 could do nothing in the case as they ceased to be the employees of the Police Department. In view of the above, the petitioner succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 25. 7. 1997 (Annex. 6) imposing the punishment of censure and order dtd. 8. 10. 1998 (Annex. 9) dismissing the appeal of the petitioner are hereby set aside being without jurisdiction. The petitioner shall be entitled for consequential benefits if any. There shall be no order as to the costs. "