VISHWAKARMA TIMBER MART Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS rule is directed against the Notification dated August 19, 1975 by which amongst 'forest Produce' 'timber' (Imarti Lakadi) was added and sought to be brought into the four-corners of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as'the Act' ).

(2.) THE argument of Mr. Maloo, on behalf of the petitioner, is limited to one point, i. e. , 'imarti Lakadi' is a forest produce and cannot be agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act. 'agricultural produce' has been defined in Section 2 (1) of the Act as follows: - "agricultural produce" includes all produce whether of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the schedule. " Mr. Maloo contended that the word 'or otherwise' should be read as generis to the words 'agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry. A forest produce cannot be used as generis with these words. Mr. Khan, on the other hand, however, contended that principle of ejusdem generis has no application in the definition and the definition has a wide import. It is argued by Mr. Khan that this question was decided by this Court in a case when this question was raised in M/s. H. Paras Ram & Sons vs. THE State of Rajasthan and others, S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1777 of 1975, decided on May 14, 1976 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. M. Lodha. This particular question whether timber is an agricultural produce or not was considered and held to be that in view of the exhaustive definition of 'agricultural produce', timber comes in the mischief of 'agricultural produce' as defined in the Act. This case considered all the cases on the point about the meaning of agricultural produce. It considered the decision reported in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, Calcutta vs. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1) in particular and Zila Parishad Bhandara vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Tirora (2), as also the case M/s. Raunaq Ram Tara Chand vs. THE State of Punjab (3 ). In M/s. Raunaq Ram Tara Chand vs. THE State of Punjab (supra): it was observed by the Supreme Court that the appellant's contention that since Gur and Shakkar are manufactured products, they cannot come within the meaning of agricultural produce' as defined in Section 2 (a) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. Section 2 (a) of the Punjab Act defines agricultural produce to mean "all produce whether processed or not, of agriculture or horticulture, animal husbandry or forest as specified in the Schedule of this Act". It has been held further that it was not possible to entertain the argument that the Court will undertake a judicial scrutiny of these items in order to come to a conclusion whether these are agricultural produce or not. In the said case it was held that in view of the definition in Section 2 (a) such an enquiry was out of place. We may also note that under Sec. 40 of the Act the State Government may by Notification in the Official Gazette add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule. On the basis of this judgment, Mr. Maloo contended that from the Notification itself it is quite clear that timber is not an agricultural produce but a forest produce and, therefore, it cannot come within the mischief of the definition. In the case reported in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, Calcutta vs. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (supra): it has been held that the term 'agriculture' cannot be confined merely to the production of grain and food products for human beings and beasts but must be understood as comprising all the products of the land, which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce and would also include forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc.

(3.) MR. Maloo further relied upon Eton Rural District Council vs. River Thames Conservators (7), about the meaning of the word 'otherwise'. It has been held by Hon'ble MR. Justice Vaisay of Chancery Division;- "an easy way of handling the matter to say that the words "or otherwise" in the first of the two contexts in which those words appear in the sub-section are of general application and mean exactly what they say. If that be the proper way of construing the section, there is an end of the matter, and the obligation by way of covenant which rests on the plaintiffs is one which the defendants are bound under the sub-section to commute. " It is further stated that the words "or otherwise" must be construed according to the ejusdem generis rule.