(1.) SHINGHAL, J. This revision petition of the husband of Smt. Sushila Devi (non-petitioner No. 1) is directed against the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer, dated March 9, 1972, by which he has upheld the order of the City Magistrate of Ajmer dated September 22, 1971 for the payment of Rs. 4,188. 50 in four monthly instalments, within a period of 4 months. The controversy in this court centres around two points only, which can be decided on the basis of the admitted facts.
(2.) SMT. Sushila Devi filed an application for an order for maintenance of herself and her daughter under sec. 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, on November 12, 1963. It was dismissed in default of her appearance on July 6, 1965 and it is not disputed that while restoring the application it was made a condition that SMT. Sushila Devi would not claim the maintenance for the period preceding July 7, 1965. The learned City Magistrate ultimately passed an order on March 14, 1969, directing that the present petitioner Karan Singh shall make a monthly allowance of Rs 60/- for the maintenance of SMT. Sushila Devi, and Rs. 20/- for the maintenance of their daughter. That order became final on September 10, 1969, when the revision petition which was directed againt it was dismissed as not pressed. In the meantime, SMT. Sushila Devi made an application on April 14, 1969 for recovery of the amount of maintenance due to her from the petitioner. She revived that application on August 27, 1970 as her earlier application had been stayed by an order of the Court of Session. The learned City Magistrate then made the aforesaid order dated September 22, 1971 for the recovery of the Rs 4,188. 50 in four monthly instalments. As that order has been upheld by she Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer, on March 9, 1972. Karan Singh has applied to this Court for its revision. These facts are not in dispute in this Court.
(3.) I have also gone through the decision in Suppuswami Padayashi vs. Jagadambal (2 ). There the view taken in Vasantam Venkayya's case (l) was applied to an order for maintenance passed under sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under the impression that there was no difference between an order passed under sec. 488 of that Code and an order under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 As has been shown in Laxman Gajju's case (14), that reasoning is not tenable, and I am in respectful agreement with that view. The same is the position regarding the decision in S. Natesa Pillai vs. Jayammal (3) for it was based on the decision in Kuppaswami Padayachi's case (2 ). In the two remaining cases of Keshawwa vs. Phadeppa Sanga-ppa (4) and Bussa Ansuya vs. Bussa Rajaish (5), their Lordships followed the decision in Vasantam Venkayya's case (l), but they were cases in which decrees had been passed lor judicial separation or maintenance and were therefore quite dissimilar from the present case. Thus the decisions on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no avail to htm and I have no hesitation in rejecting the first argument of the learned counsel.