SITARAM AND SONS Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE four writ petitions challenge the validity of the Rajasthan (Display of Prices & Stocks of Essential Commodities) Order, 1966 on various grounds to be stated hereinafter. There is no material difference in the facts of these four writ petitions and so it will be sufficient to state facts from one of the writ petitions, viz. S. B. Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1979 of 1973 (M/s Sitaram & Sons vs. State of Rajasthan) with reference to which all the writ petitions have been argued by the learned counsel for the parties. The contentions raised in all these four writ petitions are common and, therefore, the petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment.

(2.) TO resume the facts from the writ petition No. 1979 of 1973 (M/s Sitaram & Sons vs. State of Rajasthan) it may be stated that the petitioner is a dealer in iron andsteel materials at Jaipur. The Rajasthan Government issued an order known as Rajasthan (Display of Prices & Stocks of Essential Commodities ) Order 1966 which shall be hereinafter referred as the impugned order, in the exercise of powers conferred by sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act read with the notification of the Government of India, Ministry of Food Agricultural, Community Development and Co-operation, Department of Food, dated June 9, 1966 and June 18, 1966. This impugned order sought to impose restriction on the dealer in the matter of exhibition of list of prices in regard to the articles listed in the schedule to the impugned order and also enjoined upon to dealer to sell the articles subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in clause (4) of the impugned order. Certain more restrictions have been placed under the impugned order, which shall be adverted to hereinafter at appropriate places. Originally the schedule to the impugned order contained the list of articles in which the iron and steel did not find place, but later on iron and steel were also came to be added in the schedule to the impugned order prior to the filing of the writ, which fact is not disputed before me by either side. It may also be stated here that prior to the issuance of the impugned order the Government of India promulgated Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956 in exercise of its powers under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, hereinafter called the Act. The Iron & Steel ( Control) Order, 1956, which contains the provisions for the regulation and maintenance of the price and distribution of the goods and their availability at a fair prices and deals with the various matters in regard to acquisition, disposal, distribution of such articles, fixation of the prices and other ancillary matters governing the sale and purchase of the iron and steel and regulating their distribution and also maintaining the increased supply and fair distribution thereof amongst the consumers. These provisions will be referred to at an appropriate place when I shall proceed to deal with the various contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

(3.) MR. Shrimal, learned Additional Advocate General, argued that there is no specific provision made in regard to display of prices of Iron and steel in the Iron and Steel ( Control ) Order and, therefore, despite the fact that the whole sphere of law in theory may be taken to be covered by the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, but in substance and in fact it has not been exploited. It is said that there may be powers under the Iron and Steel (Control) Order for fixation and regulation of the prices and also for the regulation and supply and also of the equitable distribution thereof, but that power had not been in fact exercised and until it is exercised there is always a room for the State Government to make the provisions for regulating in regard to that sphere of law which has not actually been exploited by the orders of the Central Government. In support of his contention learned Additional Advocate General relied upon Deepchand vs. State of U. P. (3 ). This case has been noticed and distinguished in Ram Chandra Palai vs. State of Orissa (4) and wherein the three principles stated by Nicholas have been reiterated. The same position of law appears to be endorsed by the authority in State of Orissa vs. Tulloch and Co. (2 ). To my mind, therefore, there is no force in the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General. The whole field of law relating to matters specified in sec. 3 of the Act appears to be covered by the Iron and Steel (Control) Order and even if it is taken for argument's sake that specific directions have not been issued in regard to the matters envisaged by the Iron and Steel (Control) Order that would hardly make any difference. The power is there and is capable of being exercised at any time as and when the Central Government so desires. I am, therefore, of opinion that no room or scope was left with the State Government to legislate in the sphere covered by the Iron and Steel (Control) Order.