RAM BUX Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY his iudgment dated April 22, 1974 Tyagi, J. dismissed three petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which had challenged the provi-sions of sec. 297-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter called "the Act") and the Regulations made by the State Government thereunder (hereinafter called "the Regulations") on the ground of their being violative of Articles 19 (l) (f ) (g) and 14 and 31 of the Constitution of India. Before the learned single Judge it was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, who are the appellants before us, that by virtue of Art. 358 of the Constitution of India the provisions of Art. 19 were put in abeyance and, therefore, the attack was confined before him that some of the regulations were in excess of the powers under sec. 297-A of the Act and they were also discriminatory under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their petitions the appellants have come up in appeal before us. Since common question are involved in both these appeals, they being disposed of by this common order.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellants submitted that the objects which sec. 297-A of the Act was intended to attain, was the preservation of human health or the safety or convenience of the public in public places and streets and the amelioration of rickshaw pullers. That clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 297-A of the Act was merely illustrative in view of the authorities of Emperor vs. Sibnath Banerji (l) and Santosh Kumar Jain vs. The State (2 ). His contention was that sec. 297-A (2) (c) of the Act which provides for the grant of licences to rickshaw pullers only was inconsistent with the objectives indicated in sec. 297-A (l) of the Act. Regulations 5 (6), (7), (8) (e) and (11) of the Regulations were bad because they exceeded the powers conferred by sec. 297-A (l ). The learned counsel also submits that the classification between an owner rickshaw puller and a mere rickshaw puller had no reasonable nexus with the objective of sec. 297-A of the Act. He invited our attention to the statement of objects of the Act by which sec. 297-A was inserted to indicate the conditions prevailing on 1-1-1973 and he submitted this was permissible, according to the authority of Kovallapara Kottarathil Kochuni vs. States of Madras and Kerala (3 ).