KULDEEP SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE six petitioners before us are Railway servants who were removed/dismissed from service because each one of them was convicted for an offence by a criminal court. THEy complain that notwithstanding the fact that they were given the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act (hereinafter called "the Probation Act") they have been removed or dismissed. THEy have challenged their order of removal/dismissal on the grounds that it was contrary to the provisions of sec. 12 of the Probation Act or at any rate inconsistent with the objects of that statute and that it is violative of the principles of natural justice as they were never heard before removal or dismissal. THE learned Single Judge, before whom these petitions were presented, found it necessary to refer these cases to a Division Bench because Tyagi,j. in S. B. Civil Writ petitions Nos. 481, 482, 516, 517 and 600 of 1966 by his judgment dated December 19, 1969, had held that even in a case covered by clause (c) of the proviso to Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India the principles of natural justice had to be complied with. Learned Single Judge who has referred these cases to us felt that in view of the Full Bench decisions of the Delhi and the Punjab and Haryana High Courts, to which we shall presently refer, the view taken by Tyagi J. requires reconsideration.

(2.) TO eliminate repetition we first propose to deal with general arguments which have been urged in all the cases. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for one of the petitioners, urged that sec. 12 of the Probation Act has removed all disqualifications attaching to a conviction; that it is a mile-stone in the evolution of penalogy intended to reform and rehabilitate an offender and if a conviction was treated a disqualification for holding a civil post it would be contrary to the very objects of the Probation Act. Once a criminal court had considered the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and extended the benefit of the Probation Act the departmental authority, urged the counsel, should respectfully agree rather than throwing the offender out of employment.

(3.) IN Iqbal Singh vs. INspector General of Police (8), a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi considered the effect of the Probation Act qua a police servant. The petitioner in this case was a Head Constable, who was convicted for offence under sec. 333/337 of the INdian Penal Code (grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty), but was given the benefit of sec. 4 of the Probation Act. He was dismissed and the order was challenged by him on the ground that sec. 12 gave him the immunity from such dismissal. The learned Judges considering the provisions of sec. 12 and particularly the word "disqualification" after extracting the dictionary meaning of the word observed as follows: "the word 'disqualify' is also stated to mean making some one unfit for something. The further meaning given is that the person may be deprived within the meaning of the word 'disqualify' of any right or privilege. We are of the view, that the words 'disqualification, if any, attaching to conviction of an offence' as used in sec. 12 of the Act would include a person's losing his right or qualification to remain or to be retained in service. Sec. 12 of the Act clearly saves the convict from suffering, such disqualification attaching to his conviction. IN respect of his conviction, the petitioner had the protection of sec. 12 and he was saved from suffering any disqualification such as the one which resulted in his dismissal.