CHHAILA Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHANTI Vardhman Pedi, respondent No. 3, filed a suit through its Secretary Panraj, on September 13, 1955, in the Court of Sub-divisional officer, Sojat, for ejectment of petitioner Chhaila under section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, hare in after referred to as the Act, alleging that he was a trespasser. It was claimed in the suit that the land, khasra No. 1567. Chak No. 2, Sojat, was the "doli" land of the plaintiff and defendant Chhaila had taken possession without lawful authority in Smt. 2009. As Chhaila chimed that he had taken the possession through Smt. Saraswati, respondent No. 4, she was also impleaded as a defendant. Smt. Saraswati pleaded that she was entitled to lease out the land to petitioner Chhaila The trial court framed a number of issues including issue No. 2 which dealt with the question whether the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple which could be cultivated only by the "pujari". The Sub-divisional Officer submitted the record to the Court of Munsiff Sojat for the decision of issue No. 2 as it raised a question of proprietary right within the meaning of sec. 239(1) of the Act.

(2.) THE Munsiff decided that the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple and returned the record to the Sub-divisional Officer who dismissed the suit by his judgment Ex. 1 dated February 15, 1963. Respondent No 3 filed an appeal, but it was dismissed by judgment Ex 2 dated November 29. 1963 of the Revenue Appellate Authority, respondent No. 2. A second appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1. That appeal was allowed by judgment Ex. 3 dated January 22, 1965 and the suit was decreed. THE petitioner applied for a review of that judgment, but his application was dismissed by order Ex. 4 dated September 14, 1966.

(3.) JURISDICTION means "authority to decide", and the question whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not upon the correctness of its findings, but upon the nature of the facts into which it has to inquire. It is determinable at the commencement of the inquiry and not at its conclusion. A tribunal may thus lack the jurisdiction to make an inquiry, or hear an appeal, if it has been debarred from doing so by an express provision of the law. So where a tribunal is incompetent to adjudicate on a particular matter, its decision thereon is void, and is a nullity. As is obvious, there is much force in this theory of jurisdiction for it is based on logical consistency.