STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. KISHORE SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two petitions for revision of the order of Additional Sessions Judge, Jhalawar, dated October 24, 1972, by which he did not allow the prosecution to examine those witnesses who had not been examined on its behalf in the committing court and closed its evidence.

(2.) A complaint regarding the alleged commission of offences under sec. 342, 323, 354 and 376/511 was filed by Smt. Kanchan in the court of Munsif-Magistrate, Jhalawar, on March 17, 1971, against the five non-petitioners. The learned Magistrate sent it to the polite for investigation. In the meantime he registered the case on May, 1, 1971 against non-petitioners Kishore Singh and Ramnarain and dismissed the complaint against the remaining three accused. He did not, however, proceed to record the evidence against the accused and thought it proper to wait for the report of the police.

(3.) SUB-sec. (1) of sec. 286 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter alia, that the prosecutor shall open his case by reading from the Indian Penal Code the description of the offence charged, and stating shortly by what evidence he expects to prove the guilt of the accused. When that has been done, sub-sec. (2) become applicable and it provides as follows - " (2) The prosecutor shall then examine his witnesses. " It will thus appear that while under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 286 the prosecutor states shortly by what evidence he expects to prove the guilt of the accused, sub-sec. (2) provides for the examination of the prosecution witnesses. It is not disputed that in his opening address under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 286 the prosecutor stated, in short, that he expected to prove the guilt of the accused by the evidence of the witnesses mentioned in the aforesaid calendar. There was therefore no reason why it should not have been permissible, under the law, for him to examine all those witnesses. It is not in controversy in this court that they had been summoned at the instance of the Court of Session and were in attendance in that court on the date when the impugned order was passed by it.