STATE Vs. LAXMINARAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal on behalf of the State in which the trial magistrate has acquitted Laxmi Narain respondent of an offence under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter called 'the Ordinance' ). The other respondents in this appeal have been acquitted under Section 4 of the Ordinance.

(2.) THE prosecution case is that on 20th June 1960 Shri I. N. Gupta on receiving credible information issued a warrant under Section 5 of the Ordinance authorising Shri Vijay Bahadur, Station House Officer, Bhimganj Mandi, Kota with his subordinate, officers to enter the shop of. Shri Laxmi Narain and to seize all instruments of gaming, moneys, articles etc. , reasonably suspected to be used for the purpose of gaming which may be found there. Shri I. N. Gupta purported to have signed the warrant as Superintendent of Police, Kota District. On the strength of this warrant Shri Vijay Bahadur entered the hotel of Laxmi Narain and found that except the respondent Laxmi Narain, all the accused were gambling with the aid of cards in two groups and Laxmi Narain was charging commission on such gambling for his own profit. A complaint was filed against the respondent before the Assistant City Magistrate, Kota. The learned Magistrate acquitted all the accused on the ground that in this case no presumption under Section 6 of the Ordinance could be drawn as the warrant was not issued by the District Superintendent of Police as required by Section 5 of the Ordinance, nor was the warrant issued by the District Magistrate, or any other magistrate of the first Class and' that the other evidence on record was not sufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused. Hence this appeal on behalf of the State.

(3.) IN this appeal, it is conceded that if presumption under Section 6 of the Ordinance is not drawn, the other evidence on record is not sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused. The only question, therefore, in this case is: 'whether in the circumstances of this case, the presumption under Section 6 should have been drawn?' Learned Government Advocate has contended that Shri I. N. Gupta who had signed the warrant (Ex. P/4) purported to act as Superintendent of Police, Kota District, and, as such, it must be taken that Mr. Gupta was acting as District Superintendent of Police at the relevant time, and his warrant must be deemed to be a warrant issued by the District Superintendent of Police under Section 5 of the Ordinance. This contention cannot be sustained as it is evident from the statement of Mr. Gupta that he was Merely an Additional Superintendent of Police, Kota District at the relevant time.