RANG RAJ Vs. GRAM PANCHAYAT KHINWEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application by Rang Raj and seven others under Art. 226 of Constitution for a writ of mandamus and prohibition against the Gram Panchayat Khinwel, through its Sarpanch Chunnilal. The State of Rajasthan has also been made a party to this application.

(2.) THE application came up for hearing on the 7th of April, 1952 (See 1952 R. L. W. 184.), and was then allowed on the ground that the notification under sec. 4 of the Marwar Village Panchayats Act, 1935, (hereinafter called the Marwar Act) had not been issued constituting a Panchayat in this village. Later there was an application for review, which was allowed on the 10th of December, 1953. , as the notification under sec. 4 had been found out. THE application has therefore, now come up for hearing on the other points raised therein. THE case of the applicants is that the Gram Panchayat has imposed certain taxes, and that if has not the authority to do so, and therefore it should be forbidden from realizing those taxes. It is also urged that the Gram Panchayat has started taking coercive action against the applicants for realization of some of the taxes, and therefore the need for the present application. THE taxes, which are being assailed, are - (i) Kharda Lag (a kind of house tax); (ii) Nisar and Pasar tax (i. e. import and export tax) ; (iii) Tax on marriages; (iv) Tax on adoptions.

(3.) LASTLY, it was urged that there was an alternative remedy open to the applicants, as they did not avail themselves of that remedy, this Court should not issue any writ in their favour. Reliance in this connection was placed on sec. 67 of the Marwar Act, which is as follows: - "the Minister-in-charge may call for and examine the record of proceedings of any Panchayat for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any executive order passed by it under cover of this Act and may revise or modify such order as he may deem fit. " It is urged that it was possible for the applicants to approach the Minister for the revision of the order, and as they did not do so, this Court should not grant them any relief. The reply of the applicants is that they are praying for an order in the nature of prohibition, and if this Court comes to the conclusion that a tax is unjustified, the relief asked by them should not be refused on the ground that there was an alternative remedy open. Reliance is placed on Somnathmal vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) (1954 RLW, 43.) and Madan Gopal Kabra vs. The Union of India (2) (1951 RLW, 56. ). It is well-settled that a writ of prohibition would not be refused merely on the ground that an alternative remedy exists. At the same time, where there is a clear provision of law in the nature of appeal or revision recourse to which can be had, and an equally convenient, beneficial effective remedy obtained, this Court would be generally not issue writ. For example, take a case where a Munsif holds that he has jurisdiction, while one party before him contended that he had not. If the party, whose contention has been turned down, were to come to this Court praying for a writ of prohibition, it is quite clear that this Court will not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226, and leave it the party concerned to take recourse to the remedies provided under the ordinary law, namely the Civil Procedure Code. The two cases of this Court relied on by the applicants can distinguished. In Madan Gopal Kabra's case (l), the applicant would have had to submit to the assessment of income-tax on him and would have had to pay it and then could appeal under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act, and finally come to this Court for relief. This was also the case where his contention was not merely that the tax should not be levied on him alone, but that the levy of the tax itself on anybody in Rajasthan was illegal. In those circumstances, it is obvious that the alternative remedy was not equally convenient, beneficial and efficacious. Similarly, in Somnathmal's case (1) (1951 RLW, 56.), the applicant would have had to file a suit, and there also his case was not that the levy on him alone was illegal, but that the levy itself was illegal. In those circumstances also the alternative remedy was not equally effective, beneficial and convenient. But where the law under which the tax is imposed by the panchayat, itself provides for correction of illegalities as in this case under sec. 67, this Court would not generally interfere under Art. 226, though it has the power to do so.