NIHAL SINGH Vs. KALYAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the vendees against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer. Bharatpur, dated the 30th of September, 1950, in a suit or pre-emption of agricultural land instituted in that court under certain revenue laws of the former Bharatpur State. A preliminary objection has been taken that this appeal cannot be heard by this court, but should be transferred to the court of Commissioner, Jaipur Division, The appeal was originally preferred to the court of Collector Bharatpur but on the enforcement of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure & Jurisdiction) Act, he transferred the same to the court of Commissioner under sec. 6 (2) read with sec. 19 of that Act. The appeal came up for hearing before the Additional Commissioner who returned it to the Collector with an opinion that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Reference was made to secs. , 18 and 19 of the Act. The Collector, thereupon, passed the appeal to the District Judge who submitted the appeal to this Court as the valuation of the suit in the original court was in excess of Rs. 5000/ -. It is common ground the according to the law in force, the suit for pre-emption was rightly instituted in the court of the Sub - Divisional Officer, Bharatpur, and an appeal lay to the Collector against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer on the date, when it was filed. It has now to be seen whether that jurisdiction has been taken away and which court is competent to hear the appeal.

(2.) SEC. 6 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act made provision regarding pending cases. Sub-sec. 1 by a certain fiction declares that "all suits, cases, appeals, applications, references and proceedings pending before a revenue court, on the coming into force of this Act are to be deemed to have been commenced under this Act and are to be tried, heard and determined in the manner prescribed by or under this Act. " Sub-sec. 2 directs transfer of cases from one revenue court to another so as to be heard and determined according to the provisions of the Act. As under sec. 19, an appeal against the decision of a Sub-devisio-nal Officer is directed to be entertained by the Commissioner, the Collector was right in transferring the appeal to the Commissioner for disposal. Sub-sec. 3 and 4 of sec. 6 make provision for transfer of a suit, application, case or proceeding pending before a civil court to the revenue court and vice versa. There is no provision for transfer of an appeal from a civil to a revenue court or vice versa. Learned counsel argued that the words 'case or proceeding' mentioned in sub-sec. 4 are wide enough to include an appeal. Now the words "any suit application, case or proceed-ing" are used both in sub-sees. 3 and 4. So far as sub-sec. 3 is concerned, an appeal is undoubtedly excluded, for the suit, application, case or proceeding pending before a civil court is directed to be transferred to a revenue court competent under sec. 12 to deals with and dispose of the same. SEC. 12 deals with original cases and declares the powers of the revenue courts to hear the different classes of cases. As the same words have been used in sub-sec. 4 they would also have the same meaning and would exclude an appeal more so as there is reference to sec. 7 and that section also relates to suits and not to appeals. It is, therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature was not to disturb the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in respect of pending cases except so far as provision was made in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 6 of the Act. The learned Additional Commissioner held that the Commissioner was not competent to hear and dispose of the appeal as in his opinion the appeals which he could dispose of were those referred to under sec. 18. The purpose of sec. 18. is quite different from sec. 19 and should be distinguished. SEC. 18 declares the cases in which appeal can be instituted by litigants. While sec. 19 relates to the jurisdiction of the courts to hear and dispose of the appeals. If the appeal is enter-tainable by any law the court which can deal with that appeal is to be found with reference to sec. 19. In the present case as stated earlier an appeal lay against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer in the suit which had been instituted in his court. That appeal was instituted not by virtue of any right granted by sec. 18 but by right granted under the law in force on the duty of the filing of the appeal, and therefore, in the present case, sec. 18 had no relevance. SEC. 19 clearly superseded the law of any covenanting State in respect of the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeals and clause 3 provided that appeals from decrees and orders passed in suits decided by an Assistant Collector and Sub-Divisional Officer lay to the Commissioner. The Commissioner therefore, had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the present appeal. SEC. 33 of the Act provided for transfer of appeals by Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner and if that transfer had been made the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal and he was quite wrong in holding by his order of 3rd September, 1951, that he had no jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal. Maxwell says in his book on Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition, at page 221 "in general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. " In the present case the appeal was rightly instituted in the court of Collector which jurisdiction was altered to the extent mentioned in sec. 6 clause 2, but the new Act did not wholly take away the jurisdiction of the revenue courts to entertain and dispose of the appeal.