TAJ KHAN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision by the accused Taj Khan against an order of the Special Judge, Udaipur, by which he framed a charge against the petitioner under Section 161 read with Section 116. Penal Code.

(2.) The facts of the case out of which the revision arises may shortly be stated as follows. On 10-1-1952, it is alleged that the accused offered a bribe of Rs. 500/- to the Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Udaipur, with a view to gain his favour in an assessment case relating to the petitioner pending before the said officer. The latter, made a telephonic report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur, who caused an investigation to be made, and it appears that the accused was caught almost red-handed. The accused was challaned in the court of the special Judge under Section 161 read with Section 116, I. P. C. The learned Judge after recording the evidence produced by the prosecution has framed a charge against him under the aforesaid sections. This revision has been preferred against that order.

(3.) It is contended before me that the entire proceedings before the learned Special Judge are illegal and deserve to be quashed. Learned counsel puts his case in this way. According to him, an offence under Section 161 read with Section 116, I. P. C. is non-cognizable, and, therefore, the police had no authority to investigate it and present a charge-sheet against the accused, and it is further argued that on the basis of such a charge-sheet", the learned Judge could not have legally framed a charge against the accused as he has done. It is true that Section 161, Penal Code was originally a non-cognizable offence according to Schedule II thereof. By Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (No. II) of 1947, however, this offence has been made cognizable. This Act was made applicable to the State of Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance No. IV of 1930). Section 3 has since then been further amended by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act (No. LIX of 1952); but as the offence in the present case is said to have been committed in 1950, the subsequent amendments must be left out of consideration for our present purposes. Section 3 as it stood before it was amended was in these terms: