SHYAM PRAKASH MEENA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Since these writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India raise common issue of law for consideration, therefore, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common order. For brevity and convenience, wherever necessary, we shall refer to the pleadings and documents placed on record in Shyam Prakash Meena and Others Vs. Union of India and Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14258/2024) and Raja Ram and Others Vs. Union of India and Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6428/2024).

(2.) In all these petitions, the petitioners, who are transport operators, have assailed constitutional validity and vires of the provisions contained in Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1989') as amended vide notification dtd. 4/10/2021 to the extent it seeks to levy "additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness".

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Central Government derives its power to levy fee within the scope and ambit of fee that may be levied under the provisions of the Act of 1988 including Sec. 211 thereof. Moreover, the Central Government is empowered to make rules under Sec. 64 of the Act of 1988 which includes the power to levy fee for certain matters. The power to levy fee, therefore, is referable to the scheme of the Act of 1988 and no fee can be levied which is not provided under the Act of 1988. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that while power to levy fee is traceable to the rule making authority as contained in Sec. 64 of the Act of 1988 read with Sec. 211, which provides for general power to levy fee, it does not confer power to levy fee on the ground that there is delay in submission of application for renewal of fitness certificate. Prescription of the rule that additional fee shall be leviable for each day of delay in submission of application partakes the nature of fine or penalty as the delay in submission of application for renewal is sought to be penalised. This, therefore, it is contended, is not fee because it is not connected with any regulatory exercise or towards rendering services but in substance, a penal action, penalising the transport operators for not submitting applications within the prescribed period seeking renewal of fitness certificates. The provisions of the Act of 1988 do not confer any such power on the Central Government to penalise the transport operators for delay in submission of applications for renewal of fitness certificates. The provisions of the Act of 1988 only allow the Central Government to levy fee in respect of certain matters which are expressly enumerated therein. They are regulatory in nature and clearly prescribed. In addition, fee could be levied in lieu of certain services rendered on quid pro quo basis.