RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT Vs. RADHA MOHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS review petition has been filed by 'the Bar Association, Jaipur, Civil Courts' Building, Bani Park, Jaipur, (which will be hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioner'), seeking the review of the order dated 31. 3. 1993 passed in D. B. Criminal Contempt Petition No. 3184/1991 i. e. , Rajasthan High Court vs. Radha Mohan Lal and another.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the defect No. 1 that there is no specific provision of review under the Cr. P. C. is a matter of argument. Regarding defect No. 2 i. e. , want of typed copies of impugned order, Shri Jain has prayed that the same may be waived. Defect No. 2 is accordingly waived.

(3.) IT is a case in which two individuals have been punished by the division bench for criminal contempt. The petitioner association has no right to file and maintain the review petition. In Simaranjeet Singh Maan vs. Union of India (6), the Apex Court has held as under: - "ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person e. g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. If a guardian or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled aggrieved party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party aggrieved and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in the outcome thereof. In the present case no fundamental right of the petitioner before us is violated; if at all the case sought to be made out is that the fundamental rights of the two convicts have been violated. The two convicts could, if so minded, have raised the contention in the earlier proceedings but a third party, a total stranger to the trial commenced against the two convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction recorded against them. If that were permitted any and every person could challenge convictions recorded day in and day out by courts even if he persons convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined to acquiesce in the decision. If the aggrieved party invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, that may stand on a different footing as in the case of A. R. Antulay V. R. S. Nayaka. However, we should not be understood to say that in all such cases the aggrieved party has a remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution. Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognised by law, it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party to question the decision against him. Take for example a case where a person accused under Section 302, IPC is convicted for a lesser offence under Section 324, IPC. The accused is quite satisfied with the decision but a third party questions it under Article 32 and succeeds. The conviction is set aside and a fresh trial commenced ends up in the conviction of the accused under Section 302, IPC. The person to suffer for the unilateral act of the third party would be the accused. Many such situations can be pointed out to emphasise the hazard involved if such third party's unsolicited action is entertained. Cases which have ended in conviction by the apex court after a full gamut of litigation are not comparable with preventive detention cases where a friend or next of kin is permitted to seek a writ of habeas corpus. We are, therefore, satisfied that neither under the provisions of the Code nor under any other statute is a third party stranger permitted to question the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court after a regular trial. On first principles we find it difficult to accept Mr. Sodhi's contention that such a public interest litigation commenced by a leader of a recognised political party who has a genuine interest in the future of the convicts should be entertained. "