NARAIN HARISHANKAR Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this rule, the petitioner has challenged the notice dt. 19-11-1974 u/s 7b of the Rajasthan ST Act on various grounds.

(2.) THE petitioner is a firm carrying on business of sale and purchase of the grains including gram at Kota and is registered both under the CST Act and Rajasthan ST Act. THE non-petitioner No. 2 is the assessing authority of the petitioner and non petitioner No. 3 served the petitioner with a notice u/s 7b of the Rajasthan ST Act r/w s. 9 (2) of the CST Act. It further appears that the accounting year of the petitioner commences from Dewali every year and the petitioner submitted all its quarterly returns for the Samwat year 2026-27, that is, for the period commencing from October 1969 to October, 1970 the asst. year being 1970-71 under both the Acts. During that period, the petitioner sold gram worth Rs. 3,54,915 between the period commencing from 23-4-1970 to 20-6-1970 during the course of inter-State trade and the petitioner had shown the aforesaid sales in the returns as tax paid under the Rajasthan ST Act at the rate of 2% and it has not attracted any inter-State Sales Tax in view of the notification dated 9-3-1970 and as such inter-State tax was not paid along with the returns. It appears, no final assessment order in respect of the Central Sales Tax has been passed by the assessing authority in respect of the said assessment year as yet. Non-petitioner No. 3 served the petitioner with a notice u/s 7b of the Rajasthan ST Act on 12-3-1973 and 19-11-1974 informing the petitioner that the petitioner has sold gram worth Rs. 3,54,915 and 5249 bags and he asked the petitioner to show-cause why the Central Sales Tax on the said items may not be realised and further as to why penalty may not be imposed u/s 16 (1) (i of the Rajasthan ST Act. Being aggrieved by the said notice, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present rule.

(3.) IN so far as the main question is concerned that whether the CST will be applicable as on the date when it came into force, that is. 5-1-1957 or the Act of Rajasthan, unamended on that date should be applicable, in my opinion, the question further arises whether the legislation is by reference or by incorporation. While Mr. Sharma contended that the legislation is by reference to another Act but not by incorporation, Mr. Mehta contended that the legislation is by incorporation and not by reference. The distinction between these two is well settled now. It appears, however, in Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand vs. Union of Jndia (1), the Supreme Court has held, that the second point argued on behalf of the petitioners is that sub. s. (2a) of s. 9 of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers. We are not concerned with this point here as in this case this question has not been argued. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that what is done by Parliament by enacting sub s. (2a) of s. 9 is that whatever provisions relating to offences and penalties were there in the general Sales Tax Laws of the States would be applicable with appropriate modifications to assessment, re-assessment, collection and enforcement of the provisions of the Act. Legislation by incorporation of provisions of another statute even though passed by different legislature is a well known method of legislation particularly when the scheme of the other statute is similar and such incorporation is relevant and necessary for the purpose of advancing the objects and purposes of the legislation. IN view of this statement of law by the Supreme Court, it is no longer open to Mr. Sharma to argue that legislation was not by incorporation but by reference.