(1.) THE plaintiff-respondent Shanker Lal filed the suit out of which this appeal arises against Ramkaran Lal (who died during the pendency of this litigation and is red-resented by his legal representatives Smt. Gaumati and others (appellants) for declaring that the will Ex. 3, dated 3-2-1961 made by Smt. Kalawati is ineffective against the plaintiff and further that a decree for possession of the ground-floor of the house and other movable property, ornaments etc. bequeathed by Smt. Kalawati to Ramkaran Lal be granted in his favour. THE trial court decreed the suit for possession of the ground floor of the house and its judgment and decree were affirmed by the District Judge, Bharatpur, and consequently the legal representatives of Ram Karan Lal have filed this appeal.
(2.) A few relevant facts may now be stated. One Jagan Nath had three sons Chaturbhuj, Ramkaranlal (defendant) and Shanker Lal (plaintiff ). Chaturbhuj died in St. 1967, i. e. in the year 1910/11 A. D. leaving behind his widow Smt. Kalawati but no issue. Ramkaranlal went in adoption to one Ramchander some time in S. 1973 i. e. 1916-17 A. D. As already stated above, on 3. 2. 1961 Smt. Kalawati executed a will of the property in question in favour of Ramkaranlal and died about a month later. On the death of Smt. Kalawati, Ramkaranlal took possession of the property willed to him by Smt. Kalawati and thereupon Shankerlal filed the present suit on the ground that Ramkaranlal had gone in adoption to another family, and was not entitled to get any share in the family of his birth and further that Smt. Kalawati had no right to will away the property in question. The suit was resisted by Ramkaranlal mainly on the ground that Smt. Kalawati became absolute owner of the property by virtue of S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act No. 31 of 1956 which came into force on 17-6-1956. The court below held that since Smt. Kalawati did not acquire even limited ownership to the property in question on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') she could not become full owner thereof and consequently the will executed by her in respect of the property in question was not valid.
(3.) IN Rani Bai vs. Yadunandan (l) the facts were that one Jangi Jogi had a son named Laldas who pre-deceased the former leaving behind his widow Rani Bai. After the death of Laldas, Jangi Jogi married Mst. Jugli and died two years after their marriage. After Jangi Jogi's death, Mst. Jugli gifted the property in dispute to Yadunandan who obtained possession of the same in the course of criminal proceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P. C. Thereupon Mst. Jugli and Smt. Rani Bai jointly instituted a suit for declaration in respect of their rights, and for possession of the property. Jugli Bai filed an application under O. 23, R. 3 Civil P. G. and the question arose before their Lordships as to whether Rani Bai was entitled to the property from Yadunandan. It was observed by their Lordships that Rani Bai was entitled to receive maintenance out of the share of her father-in-law and that although her claim for maintenance was not a charge upon the estate until it had been fixed and specifically charged thereupon, her right was not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. They further observed that the Courts in INdia have taken the view that where a widow is in possession of a specific property for the purpose of her maintenance, a purchaser buying with notice of her claim is not entitled to possession of that property without first securing proper maintenance for her (vide Rachawa vs. Shivayogappa 1894 ILR Bom. 679 ). It was observed - "it is clear from the provisions of the Explanation appearing in sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that a situation was contemplated where a female Hindu could be in possession of joint family properties in lieu of maintenance. It may be mentioned that after the enforcement of the Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1956 the rights of widowed daughter-in-law to maintenance are governed by sec 19 of that Act which, however, could not be applicable. IN the present case, it is difficult to understand how the appellant could be deprived of the possession of properties by a trespasser. Moreover she was presumably in possession of these properties in lieu of her right of maintenance and could not be deprived of them even by Jugli Bai without first securing proper maintenance for her out of the aforesaid properties. " (The italic is mine)