PRABHULAL Vs. IMAMUDDIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application by Prabhulal against whom the Receiver Imamuddin in the insolvency proceedings against Bajranghlal, Gujarmal and Kesarlal has obtained an order from the court of the Civil Judge, Tonk, giving leave to file a suit in forma pauperis.

(2.) WE have heard Mr. H. S. Sahai on behalf of the petitioner. The opposite party is unrepresented nor has the Receiver himself appeared in court. It was urged by Mr. Sahai that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. means only a natural person and not a juristic person. The Receiver would not therefore be deemed to be a person within the meaning of Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. and permission was wrongly accorded to him to file a suit in forma pauperis. For his contention, the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the rulings in the cases of Associated Pictures Ltd. vs. The National Studios Ltd. (1) (AIR, 1951 Pun. 447.); S. M. Mitra vs. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance (2) (AIR, 1930 Ran. 259.); Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh (3) (AIR, 1938 Cal. 745. ). In these cases it was decided that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. is confined to a natural person and does not apply to a juristic person like a limited company or an official receiver. With due respect to the learned Judges who took his view of the word "person" in Order, 33 Rule 1, C. P. C. we are of opinion that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1, has the same meaning as in clause (2) of sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. There the word "person" is defined as including any company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. There does not appears to be anything repugnant in Order 33, Rule 1 so as to limit the meaning of the word "person" only to natural persons. Mr. H. S. Sahai was frank enough to put before us also those authorities wherein the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 has been given the same meaning, which think it should bear. In Peru Mal Koundan vs. Tirumalrayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sanka Nidhi Ltd. (4) (AIR, 1918 Mad. 362.) it was held that Order 33, Rule 1 applies to suits by companies and nidhis and the latter can take advantage of its provisions if they are paupers. It was further observed that the word "person" in the order has the same meaning as in the General Clauses Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context and includes any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. In that case the intending plaintiff was a joint stock company. Again in Syed Ali vs. The Deccan Commercial Bank Ltd. (1) (AIR 1951 Hydbd. 124.) is was held by a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court that the word "person" includes not only a natural person but also a juristic person and there is nothing in the Code to prevent a juristic person from filing a suit. If, therefore, such a person has no sufficient means to pay the court fee, Order 33 will apply, as its object is to facilitate the filing of a pauper suit and on principle that facility should be given to all litigants entitled to it. Thus, a joint stock company which has gone into liquidation is entitled to it. Thus, a joint stock company which has gone into liquidation is entitled to sue as a pauper. The explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33 C. P. C. was also taken into consideration and it was observed that an explanation had not the same merit as a definition and that there was nothing repugnant in the Code which made the definition of "person" given in sec. 3 (39) now (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, inapplicable to "person" in Order 33 of the Code. The explanation of "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 is merely illustrative without being exhaustive.