SHIVDAYAL Vs. NARAINDAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are three connected revisions, and we shall deal with them in one judgment as the main point raised in them is the same.

(2.) CIVIL revision No. 178 is by Shivdayal. He was tenant of a house in Jodhpur and his. landlords were Naraindas and others. The tenant Shivdayal made a complaint on 29. 4. 49 under sec. 3 of the Marwar House Rent Control Act (No. XXV) of 1949 to be hereinafter called the Marwar Act to the Controller that the rent of his house was excessive and fair rent should be determined. This matter was decided by the Controller on the 15th January, 1951, after the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, (hereinafter called the Rajasthan Act) had come into force. Shivdayal then filed an appeal before the District Judge, which was dismissed. The landlord Naraindas first filed an appeal before the Collector, but that was returned for presentation to the proper court, and then that appeal also was filed before the District Judge who disposed of both the appeals by one judgment. Shivdayal has come in revision to this Court, and even though he himself filed an appeal before the District Judge has now taken the curious position: that that court had no jurisdiction.

(3.) IT will be seen that the impugned orders in this case were with reference to fixation of fair rent under the Marwar Act. That function was assigned to the Controller and not to the court. But under the Rajasthan Act that function is assigned to the court and not to the Controller. All the three orders, which were taken in appeal to the District Judge, were passed in this case by the Controller under the provisions of sec. 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act. Ordinarily such cases of fixation of rent would, under the Rajasthan Act, now be suits and would lie in the court. But the legislature specifically provided under sec. 27 (2) that all cases; pending before the Controllers, whatever may be their nature, would be decided by Controllers notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Rajasthan Act. This clearly means that even cases relating to fixation of fair rent, which would alter the passing of the Rajasthan Act be decided by the court, were allowed by sec. 27 (2) to be decided by the Controllers notwithstanding the provisions of the Rajasthan Act. There is no doubt in our mind that these cases were decided by Controllers and not by courts. Under these circumstances, no appeal will lie to the District Judge under sec. 22 (1) from such orders, because an appeal under that section lies only from the orders of a court and not from the order of a Controller. Sec. 22 (1) provides for certain specific appeals, while sec. 22 (3) is very much wider in application, and allows appeals from all orders passed by the Controller to such authority as the Government may, from time to time, appoint in that behalf. Where of course an appeal would come within the terms of sec. 22 (1), sec. 22 (3) will not apply. But where, as in this case, the appeal does not come within the terms of sec. 22 (1), because, the order in appeal was not passed by the court but by the Controller, the appeal from an order of the Controller under sec. 27 (2) also would lie, under sec. 22 (3), to such authority as the Government may, from time to time, appoint in that behalf. We are, therefore, of opinion that the appeal in all these three cases lay under sec. 22 (3) to such authority as the Government may appoint and not to the court of the District Judge.