THAKUR LAWMAN SINGH Vs. THAKUR RAJ JUJAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by Thakur Laxman Singh against the judgment of the District Judge Pali, and has arisen in the following circumstances:

(2.) LAXMAN Singh brought a suit against Jujar Singh in the court of Civil Judge, Sirohi, for possession of certain property and mesne profits. The case of LAXMAN Singh was that the parties were descendants of a common ancestor named Vijai Singh who was jagirdar of Bhatana. Vijai Singh had three sons, one of whom died childless. The remaining sons were Sabal Singh and Surajmal. Sabal Singh succeeded to the jagir, and Surajmal was given two-fifths share of the jagir after an arbitration and compromise in Svt. 1963. Thus the jagirdar had three-fifths of the jagir, and the junior branch had two-fifths. This state of affairs continued till Svt. 1944 when disputes again arose between the jagirdar and members of the junior branch when certain orders were passed by the then Ruler of Sirohi. In 1925 there were again disputes between the parties, and the entire matter was referred, with the permission of His Highness the Maharaja Saheb of Sirohi, to the arbitration of five Panchas, the Maharaja being the Sarpanch. The arbitrators gave an award on the 12th July, 1927, which finally and conclusively determined the rights of the parties. The jagir was partitioned, and separate shares were allotted to the two branches and the plaintiff came in possession of his share which was given in schedule B attached to the plaint. This continued till 1948 when Her Highness the Dowager Maharani Saheba set aside the decision of the 12th July, 1937, by an order passed on the 20th November, 1948, in consequence whereof certain properties, which were in the possession of the plaintiff, were handed over to the defendant. These properties were mentioned in schedule C, and the plaintiff's suit was for possession of these properties. He alleged that the order of Her Highness the Dowager Maharani, dated the 20th of November, 1948, was of no force and void for the following reasons - (1) Her Highness as Raj Mata had no powers whatsoever; (2) The matter was never decided by the Board of Regency and not referred to the other members thereof, (3) The order of the sovereign ruler cannot be set aside or questioned by any authority whatsoever other than a sovereign ruler himself; (4) The order could only be set aside by means of a proper proceeding before a competent court of law, and the Raj Mata Saheba was not a court; (5) That proper procedure and rules of natural justice were not followed by Her Highness the Raj Mata Saheba in setting aside the award.

(3.) THE mere fact that some action of the State is being impugned in a suit is not enough to make the State a necessary party, though in certain circumstances it may be proper to implead the State. In Vaithilinga Pandara Sannidhi Audhina Karthar Tiruvaduthurali Adhinam vs. Sada-siva Iyer and others (3) (A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 836.), it was held that the Secretary of State was not a proper or necessary party to every suit in which any question was raised with regard to the legality of any statute. THE same view was held in Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu vs. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (4) (A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 927. ). In Dolatsinghji Jaswantsinghji vs. Khachar Mansur Rukhad and others (5) (A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 150.), the Ruler of Limbdi State in Kathiawar had come to an agreement with the Government in connection with entry of certain Girasias as Mulgametis, and further that Mulgametis shall be considered as Talukdars for purposes of the Gujrat Talukdars Act. Later, the Ruler brought a suit that he was entitled to be entered as Talukdar under the Gujrat Talukdars Act, and the agreement between the Ruler and the Government was put up as defence, and it seems to have been contended that Government was a necessary party. THEir Lordships held that Government was neither a necessary nor a proper party in the circumstances of that case, as the question to be decided was independent of the validity or invalidity of the agreement.