LAWS(RAJ)-2013-2-102

AROMA M PHILEMON Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Decided On February 07, 2013
Aroma M Philemon Appellant
V/S
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, Smt. Aroma M. Philemon, has prayed for quashing FIR No.400/11, registered at Police Station Ashok Nagar, Jaipur Metropolitan (South) for offences under Section 306 IPC, and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (henceforth referred to as 'the SC/ST Act').

(2.) Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner happens to be the Principal of Saint Soldier Public School in Jaipur. In the School, eating of Gutkha and smoking by the students is strictly prohibited. However, on 29.11.2011, it was discovered that few students had eaten Gutkha and had spit on the walls of the school. This fact was reported to the petitioner on 30.11.2011. It was decided that school bags of the students should be searched. In the bag of Shubham Khoda, six pouches of Pan Masala and Gutkha were discovered. In the bag of another student, namely Mohd. Shoaib, few pouches of Gutkha and a knife were discovered. The parents of both the students were called; both the students were resticated from the school. However, subsequently, the parents met the Chairman of the Managing Committee and assured them that the children would adhere to the discipline of the school. Therefore, they were permitted to come back to the school. They rejoined the school on 9.12.2011. On 9.12.2011, both the students were asked to apologize before the assembly of students and to promise that they would not break the discipline of the school. Shubham Khoda continued to attend the school till 21.12.2011. However, in the intervening night of 21.12.2011 and 22.12.2011, he committed suicide. On 24.12.2011, a FIR was registered against the petitioner for offence under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. During the course of investigation, a suicide note was discovered wherein Shubham Khoda has written that the petitioner "is responsible for my death". Hence, this petition before this court for quashing of the FIR.

(3.) Mr. S.S. Hora, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, that a bare perusal of the FIR does not disclose the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC. According to the complainant-respondent, Ramphool Meena, the father of Shubham Khoda, it is alleged that the petitioner and the PTI, Vikram Singh Shekhawat, used to mentally and physically torture his son because he was a member of a Scheduled Tribe. He further alleged that they used words with his son which referred to his Scheduled Tribe status. It is due to the cruelties inflicted on him that he finally committed suicide. Secondly, before an offence under Section 306 IPC can be made out, the ingredients of abetment as defined under Section 107 IPC, have to be culled out from the allegations. An abetment is an instigation by any person for doing of the thing, or entering into a criminal conspiracy for doing a thing, or intentionally aiding by any act or illegal omission. However, in the present case, the petitioner has neither instigated, nor intentionally aided, nor entered into a criminal conspiracy for the suicide to be committed by Shubham Khoda. Merely because the child has written in the suicide note that the petitioner is responsible for his death, it cannot be concluded that she had instigated, or intentionally aided his suicide. Thirdly, as the Principal of the school, the petitioner is responsible for maintaining discipline in the school. In order to maintain the discipline, at times, the teachers or the Principal may have to speak a bit harshly. But, such a rebuke cannot be taken as an act of instigation, or intentionally aiding the commission of suicide. If a mild scolding of a child is seen as "an abetment of suicide", it would be difficult to maintain discipline in the school. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are conspicuously missing in the present case. Fourthly, as far as the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is concerned, the learned counsel has pleaded that the complainant had never lodged any written or oral complaint that his son has been discriminated, or was insulted due to his caste. After having lost his son, the complainant has fabricated the facts as an after-thought. Hence, he has tried to create an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Lastly, that the school has other students who also belong to the Scheduled Tribe community, but none of them have ever complained that the petitioner was prejudiced, or had treated them harshly because of their caste status. Therefore, the ingredients of offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act are also missing in the present case. Thus, the FIR deserves to be quashed.