NAND KANWAR Vs. SAJJAN DEVI AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. is directed against the order dated 21.8.1990 passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Udaipur (for short 'the trial court') whereby the trial court allowed the application filed by respondents under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the code') and restrained the defendant-appellant from letting out the suit property and directed her to maintain status quo of the said property during the pendency of the suit. Aggrieved by the order impugned, defendant-appellant has preferred this appeal.

(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned.

(3.) Undisputably, the suit property is jointly owned and, therefore, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed a suit for partition before the trial court inter alia, alleging therein that the suit property is jointly owned and defendants had threatened to transfer the suit property during the pendency of partition suit. It was alleged that defendants agreed to let out part of the property to some other persons. In the written statement, the defendant appellant admitted that the suit property is jointly owned and there was no partition between the parties. The trial court while deciding three essential ingredients for grant or refusal of temporary injunction viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, held that undisputably, the property is jointly owned by the parties and from the written statement filed by the defendant-appellant, it appeared that defendant-appellant intended to let out a part of the suit property so as to put the plaintiff-respondents in disadvantageous position. The trial court also held that balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiffs; if the position of suit property is not protected during pendency of the suit, it would result in multiplicity of proceedings and the plaintiffs would be put to disadvantageous position; in case the defendant appellant is not restrained from transferring or letting out the suit property, plaintiffs would be put to irreparable injury but if the defendant-appellant is restrained from transferring or letting out the suit property, she would not suffer any irreparable injury. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court was of the opinion that during the pendency of the suit, status quo of the suit property should be maintained and accordingly it passed the injunction order against the appellant.