BHAIRU SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition has been filed for issuing a direction to the respondents to withdraw the order of his dismissal from Army Service as well as the impugned order Annex. 8 dated 5. 2. 2000, by which the petition filed by the petitioner was rejected by General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and taking the petitioner on duty as if such orders have not been passed.

(2.) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition, in brief, are that the petitioner was recruited by the Branch Recruitment Officer (for short, "b. R. O. ") on 26. 12. 97 and the relevant Enrolment Form was filled-up by the Havaldar of B. R. O. Office and petitioner replied all the quarries made by the Havaldar. On being recruited, he had undergone the training and was waiting for attestation. A verification of character and antecedents was called from the District Magistrate, Jodhpur, who after due verification, sent the Verification Roll (Annx. 3) stating therein that the petitioner was prosecuted in criminal case No. 52 dated 19. 6. 1994 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 447, 336, 353 and 332, IPC and after trial, he was convicted but given the benefit of Sections 4 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, vide judgment and order dated 26. 9. 1996 of the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Balesar (Jodhpur ). THEreupon a tentative charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner by the respondent Authority and respondents proceeded to record summary of evidence and ultimately the petitioner was tried by Summary Court Martial. Petitioner pleaded guilty before the Court Martial. Punishment of dismissal from service was awarded vide order dated 26. 6. 99. Against the order of dismissal from service, petitioner preferred an appeal but the same also stood rejected vide impugned order Annx. 8 dated 5. 2. 2000. Hence this petition.

(3.) IT is difficult to say that information which was required from the petitioner in Column No. 8 of the Enrolment Form was in respect of only those offences which were related to moral turpitude. Suitability for a post has several dimensions. Even if an offence is not related to moral turpitude, the motive behind commission of the offence, the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the manner of commission of the offence, the consequences arising from commission of the offence, may be relevant for the purpose of assessing the suitability of the candidate for a post. The fact that the petitioner was prosecuted in a criminal trial is a material fact, suppression whereof, when enquired about, would entitle the employer to inflict penalty in accordance with law. The petitioner was convicted by the criminal court. However, instead of sentencing him to any imprisonment, the trial Court granted the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act to him, which does not obliterate the fact of prosecution and conviction by the Court. The suppression of such material fact by itself disentitles the petitioner to remain in Army services where norms of discipline need strictly be adhered to. All those persons who desire employment under the State must, therefore, be deemed to be under a legal duty to speak the truth to the employer not only while applying for the post but also when appearing in the written examination or during the interview or at any time thereafter. IT is, therefore, absolutely necessary that a person who is desirous to be appointed in Disciplined Force, must consider it his duty to respond and to answer truly without committing "suppressio veri" and "suggestio falsi" while dealing with the employer or with the subjects.