LAKSHMI CEMENT Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS special appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated July 24, 2002 (Lakshmi Cement v. State of Rajasthan [2004] 134 STC 200 (Raj)) dismissing the appellant's writ petition challenging the reassessment notice dated April 19, 2001 given by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Anti Evasion, Rajasthan, Circle-I, Jaipur, under section 30 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the RST Act") read with section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as "the CST Act") for the assessment year 1997-98.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case are that the appellant is, inter alia, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Portland cement and it is registered dealer under the RST Act and the CST Act. The appellant started production of cement before the year 1984-85. Its regular CST assessments for the assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91 were made by the assessing authority, i. e. , Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Pali, vide assessment orders dated December 11, 1991 and May 20, 1993 respectively. At this stage, it would be relevant to mention that the State of Rajasthan issued a notification dated May 6, 1986 in exercise of powers under section 8 (5) of the CST Act allowing partial exemption from tax payable in respect of inter-State sales in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned therein. This exemption was granted to provide incentive to reduce branch/stock transfers on which no tax is leviable in the State and to increase the inter-State sale on which the tax is leviable under the CST Act. The twin objectives which the notification seeks to achieve is to increase the quantum of goods sold in the course of inter-State trade while reducing the quantum of branch/stock transfers so as to increase the State revenue. The partial exemption given at the rate of 50 per cent/75 per cent of the CST based upon the increase in the percentage of inter-State sales and decrease in the percentage of stock/branch transfers in comparison to the corresponding percentage of the base year 1984-85. Thus, the appellant submitted an application dated July 5, 1994 before the Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Pali, to determine percentage of inter-State sales and branch transfers of non-levy cement effected by it during the base year in order to avail the benefit under the above referred notification dated May 6, 1986. The Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Pali, by order dated February 3, 1995 after verifying and scrutinising the record of the appellant, determined the following percentage of inter-State sales, branch transfers and intra-State sales of non-levy cement of the base year 1984-85 in terms of the notification dated May 6, 1988 as follows : " Branch transfers 85. 28 per cent Inter-State Sales 2. 51 per cent Intra-State Sales 12. 21 per cent. "

(3.) IN Black Stone's case [2001] 124 STC 130 (Raj); (2001) 3 RLW 1486, the division Bench held that the expression "for any reason" cannot go in the realm of assuming the expression "for any reason" to bring in mere change of opinion to have a just second look on the very issue and material for drawing different conclusions either because the same officer having a second thought or a successor officer holding a different view within its compass. The division Bench relied upon the earlier division Bench judgment of this Court in National Clinic v. Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer reported in (1966) RLW 257, wherein it was held that mere change of opinion will not be enough to initiate an action because in very nature of things, it will not be reasonable thing to do. However, in the subsequent decision of the division Bench in Akbarali Amanatali v. Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer reported in (1976) RLW 648, the Court held that the words "for any reason" in Section 12 (1) of the Act, are wide enough and the power of the Commercial Taxes Officer is not circumscribed by any condition. The said decision was followed in the matter of Bhanwar Lal Binjaram v. Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer reported in (1976) WLN (UC) 459 (Raj) and it was held that the expression "for any reason" is wide enough to include even the change of opinion. The apex Court in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar reported in [1959] 37 ITR 388; AIR 1959 SC 1303 dealing with section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural INcome-tax Act, which is in pari materia to section 12 of the Act, held that the use of words "any reason" which are of wide import dispenses with those conditions by which section 34 of the INcome-tax Act is circumscribed. It is submitted that the expression "for any reason" used in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the Act of 1994 and the expression "in any way and under any circumstances" used in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the Act of 1994 are of even wider amplitude than only expression "for any reason" used in sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1954. It is argued that the expression used in section 30 of the Act of 1994 deserves to be interpreted in the light of the various decisions of the apex Court and it leaves no manner of doubt that the Legislature intended to empower the assessing authority with the power even wider than the power they were given under the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act of 1954. It is urged that the expression in section 30 of the Act of 1994 in their realm even includes "mere change of opinion". It is submitted that the ratio laid down in Black Stone's case [2001] 124 STC 130 (Raj); (2001) 3 RLW 1486, runs counter to the decision of the apex Court in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh's case [1959] 37 ITR 388; AIR 1959 SC 1303.