(1.) WE have heard Mr. D. N. Yadav learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K. R. Bishnoi learned Public Prosecutor.
(2.) THE petitioner a life convict voiced his grievances to the effect that inspite of the fact he remained in Jail for more than 14 years the State Government has not considered his case for premature release in right perspective by addressing a letter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. THE letter has been transmitted by the Supreme Court under communication dated 22. 10. 2002 to this Court. Instant writ petition has been registered on the said letter. THE counter supported by affidavit of Shri S. S. Bissa, Superintendent, Central Jail, Jodhpur reveals that the petitioner was convicted for offence under section 302, 397, 460 and 395 I. P. C. and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He has served the sentence of 17 years and 6 months. THE stand of the State Government is that the petitioner is not entitled to premature release in view of Rule 9 of the Rajasthan Prisons (Shortening of Sentences) Rules 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1958) which provides prohibition to place the cases of the convicts before the Advisory Boards sentenced for the offence involving rape, dacoity and other serious offence. As the petitioner has been convicted for offence of dacoity, his case has not been placed before the advisory Committee.
(3.) UNDER the constitutional scheme the President is the Chief Executive of Union of India in whom the executive power of the Union vests. Similar the Governor is the Chief Executive of the concerned State and in whom vests the executive power of the State. Articles 72 and 161 vests the clemency power of pardon etc. , on the President and the State Government, respectively. This constitutional power would over-ride the statutory power contained in Section 433a of the Code as well as the power conferred by Section 54 & 55, I. P. C. This power can be exercised by the President/governor only on the advice of the Council of Ministers. In Maru Ram's case the Constitutional Bench recommended for framing of guidelines for exercise of powers under Article 72 & 161 of the Constitution. In the subsequent decision i. e. Kehar Singh vs. Union of India (2), the Apex Court expressed the view that the language of Article 72 itself provide sufficient guide lines for exercise of power and having regard to its wide amplitude and the status of the function to be discharged thereunder, it was perhaps unnecessary to spell out specific guidelines since such guidelines may not be able to conceive of all myriad kinds and categories of cases which may come up for the exercise of such power.