VISHNU IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES Vs. GOVIND RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil second appeal under Order 42 Rule 1 r/w Section 100 CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 4. 4. 2002 passed by the learned Addl. Distt. Judge No. 3, Ajmer in Civil Regular Appeal No. 12/02 whereby the appeal has been dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 8. 12. 1987 passed by the learned Munsiff (East), Ajmer city in COS No. 476/75 has been confirmed.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated the relevant facts necessary for the decision of this appeal are that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the appellant-defendant on twin grounds of default in payment of rent and subletting of suit premises without the permission and consent of the plaintiff. The appellant-defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement denying all the averments made in the plaint and further pleading that the premise let out comprised of three rooms and two `tibaras' and not two room and two `tibaras' as pleaded by the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that monthly rent of Rs. 85/- was inclusive of electricity and water charges. There was no default in payment of rent. The premises were sub-let with the permission and consent of the plaintiff. The trial Court framed 8 issues stemming from the pleadings of the parties, recorded their evidence and after hearing them decreed the suit on 8. 12. 1987 holding that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent but declined to pass decree of eviction on this ground giving him benefit of first default. The defendant was also found to have sub-let the suit premises without permission and consent of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed for eviction on this ground. The defendant preferred an appeal against the aforesaid decree.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has first argued on the basis of cases of `ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs. (1), and `kulwant Kaur & Ors. vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and others (2), that there are two situations in which interference in findings of fact is permissible; first, when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion; second, where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence with which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. He has contended that in either of these two situations, a substantial question of law would arise. There are no and cannot be two opinions about the principle of law laid down in these authorities. According to him these parameters are fully satisfied in this appeal, so as to warrant interference of this court in the second appeal.