LOKENDER SINGH Vs. R S E B

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER was first employed as casual labour on 1.5.1979. On completion of 240 days, the petitioner was taken on work -charge establishment vide Annx. 1 dated 5.1.1980. He went on three days casual leave with effect from 27.11.1984 which, according to the petitioner's representation dated 14th January, 1988, filed as Annx.4, and, according to the reply of the respondents; was extended upto 28th December, 1984. Thereafter, according to the petitioner, he reported back on duty on 13th and 14th September, 1986. According to the petitioner, he was sick and he had made applications for extension of leave. The petitioner was not taken on duty on 13.9.1986 but was told that his case has been referred to the higher authorities for consideration whether he can be taken on duty or not ? This fact of the petitioner's having been reported on duty on 13.9.1986 and that he was offered any such information is denied by the respondents. According to the respondents, since his absence from duty, the petitioner made first contact vide his representation dated 19.1.88 and in that letter, he falsely averred that he reported for duty on 13th and 14th September, 1986 at Sojat City. When the petitioner has not at all reported on 13.9.1986 then there was no occasion for giving him any reply for not taking him on duty.

(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that in spite of making several representations thereafter, he has not been taken on duty. According to him, unless his services are terminated in accordance with law, either by following the procedure of holding an inquiry into the allegation of wilfull absence from duty and a proper termination order is passed or his services are dispensed with in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act of 1947'); the relationship of master and servant continues. There cannot be any automatic cessation of such relationship. Therefore, according to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the services of the petitioner have been brought to an end, against the principles of natural justice and being in violation of the provisions of the Act of 1947, the termination should be treated as void ab initio.

(3.) APART from above conduct of the petitioner, it has been stated by the respondents that as per clause 9[h) of the Regulations of 1975, which governs the terms of services of the petitioner, the petitioner had voluntarily terminated his contract of service. Clause 9(h) provides for deeming voluntary termination of contract of service in case an employee remains absent from duty without leave, for a fixed period. It is submitted that the petitioner's services were not terminated, nor it was treated to have come to an automatic end; but he was informed by registered notice dated 2.5.1985, after he has absented himself from duty for a period of 135 days without leave, calling upon his attention to clause 9(h) of the Regulations and giving him an opportunity to resume his duty by 30.5.1985. It was also made clear that his failing to assume duty by 30.5.1985 will be deemed that he has voluntarily left the services. This letter was sent at the home address of the petitioner which was returned with the endorsement of not found' but fact remains that the registered notice was sent to the residential address of the petitioner. He had not left any other address at which he could be communicated during the period of his absence. In these circumstances, according to learned Counsel for the respondents, only reasonable inference is that the petitioner has not availed the opportunity to join duty in spite of such opportunity having been offered to him, by deliberately avoiding the service of the notice by returning it back.