POORAN MAL Vs. RAHMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this tenant's second appeal the question of law which arises for determination relates to interpretation of Section 13(1)(j) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. While the appellant's case is that the non-user of the premises for a continuous period of six months must be taken into consideration from the date of the suit, the respondent's case is that once the non-user is for six months, the tenant is liable to be evicted.

(2.) THE facts of this case require brief narration for the purpose of decision of the question of law involved in this appeal. The respondent-landlord leased out the disputed premises to the appellant-tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. On 7.5.1981 he filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent in the Court of Munsiff, Sikar. The main ground of eviction as set out by the landlord in his plaint related to default in payment of rent and non-user of disputed premises for a period of two years. The landlord pleaded that the tenant had not been using the shop in question and had closed it completely. He had not been living in Sikar for two years and was serving with M/s. Sugan Chand Shri Kishan at Calcutta. He remitted the rent of disputed shop from Calcutta. The rent was sent up to 7.12.1979 and, thereafter, rent for the period of 17 months had not been paid despite the demand and had not vacated the disputed shop. The tenant refuted the claim of the landlord and asserted that he has been doing business of manufacturing ornaments. The disputed shop had not been closed and he had not been in the service of any person at Calcutta. The landlord was interested in enhancing the rent, therefore, when he (tenant) had sent the amount of rent by M.O. the landlord had declined to accept the same. This the landlord did deliberately in order to project the tenant as a defaulter. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court framed five issues. The first issue related to default in payment of rent, the second related to non-user of the premises for a period of more than two years. On the first issue learned trial Judge held that the tenant had deposited the rent in the Court as per the determination made by the Court under Section 13(3) of 1950 Act, therefore, no decree of eviction could be passed in the light of the provisions of Section 13(6) of the Act. On the second issue, learned trial Judge analysed the evidence of the parties and held that the plaintiff had not been able to establish that immediately before the filing of the suit the tenant had not been doing the business for which the shop was leased out to him. No cogent evidence has been placed on record to establish that the tenant had been serving in Calcutta with some one else and sufficient evidence 2as not available on record to hold that the tenant was doing service in Calcutta for three years and was not using the disputed shop without reasonable cause for a period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. On the basis of his findings the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the respondent-landlord except to the extent of arrears of rent. In appeal of the landlord, learned Additional District Judge, Sikar, reversed the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2. Learned lower appellate Court took note of the fact that a money-order dated 7.12.1979 (Ex. 1) was sent by the tenant from Calcutta and another money-order (Ex. 2) was also sent from Calcutta. The first money-order related to a period of 12 months and since the money-order for over 12 months had been sent from Calcutta, it was the duty of the tenant to have established that he had been using the shop in dispute. Learned lower appellate Court discarded the testimony of the witness of the tenant and held that during 1979, 1980 and 1981 the tenant had been in Calcutta, therefore, the disputed shop had not been used. This non-user of the shop was without any reason. Shri A.K. Bajpai, learned counsel for the appellant, has strenuously argued that the learned lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction to disturb the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. He urged that the learned lower appellate Court has not given any cogent reason for upsetting the finding recorded by the trial Court in the context of Section 13(1)(j). Mere fact that the learned lower appellate Court entertained a different view on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties, it did not entitle the learned lower appellate Court to reverse the judgment passed by the trial Court. Shri Bajpai referred to the documents, Ex. 3, Ex. 4 and Ex. 5 and asserted that the notice dated 19.4.1981 sent on behalf of the landlord was received by the tenant on 27.4.1981 at Sikar. The suit was filed in the trial Court on 7.5.1981. The very fact that the tenant had received the notice sent to him goes to show that he was at Sikar and not in Calcutta. Therefore, he cannot be said to have not been using the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. Shri S.R. Bajwa, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, on the other hand, argued that this Court cannot upset a finding of fact arrived at by the learned lower appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Bajwa urged that the learned lower appellate Court has minutely examined the evidence of both the parties and then came to the conclusion that the tenant was not using the premises in question for a period of three years.

(3.) IN Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition), the word 'immediate' has been defined to mean, present; at once; without delay; not deferred by any interval of time. In this sense, the word, without any very precise signification, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Third Revised Edition), the word 'immediately' has been defined as, the words "forthwith" and "immediately" have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression "within a reasonable time" and imply prompt, vigorous action without any delay. The word "preceding" has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edn.), to mean, that precedes in order of time or moment." In Eager v. Furnivall, 17 Ch..D. 120, it has been held that "where a consequence or conclusion of law is to follow "immediately after" an event, that means "the next moment after."