(1.) AS identical questions of law are involved in these cases it would be convenient to dispose of these cases by one common order.
(2.) ACCORDING to the petitioners, they are residents of village Moongaska in the vicinity of City of Alwar. Acquisition proceedings of 189 Bighas 10 Biswas of land was taken by the respondents and in pursuance thereof a notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the-Act') was issued on 11th March, 1981. A notification dated 7th August, 1981, published in Rajasthan Gazette Part 1 (Kha) dated August 13, 1981, was issued under Section 6 and 17 (4) of the Act. ACCORDING to the petitioners they were served with individual notices under Section 9 of the Act when they came to know about the land acquisition proceedings. The acquisition proceedings are challenged mainly on the ground that: (i)- Notification under Section 4 (1) was not published in accordance with requirement of section 45 of the Act nor was it served on the petitioners; (ii)- No notice under Section 4 (5) was issued and put by the competent authority nor such notice was served on the petitioners; (iii)- the State Government did not apply its mind on the question of urgency and dispense with the provisions of Section 5a without any basis; (iv)- The State Government did not apply its mind to the question whether the land was waste or arable; (v)- the acquisition proceedings were started in the year 1971 also for the purpose of Rajasthan Small Scale Industries Corporation, but after objections were raised by aggrieved persons, the same were dropped on 31st August, 1971 and therefore, there was no public purpose involved in the matter.
(3.) THIS is the ground on which a serious controversy has been raised by the petitioners. It is contended that in the instant case the State Government has not been able to disclose the circumstances which necessitated climination of an inquiry under Section 5a of the Act. The respondents have neither disclosed the nature of the industries, nor the circumstances which have rendered it so imperative to take immediate possession of the land. It is submitted that the mere fact that the land was required for establishment of industries and extension of industrial area could not have formed the basis for invoking the powers under Section 17 (4) of the Act. Neither the need to establish industry nor the need to expend the existing industrial area can came into existence over night. By the very nature of things, the requirement for the same, if any, must have gradually emerged and there was no reason as to why the Government did not initiate the acquisition proceedings well in advance. The urgency should be of such a nature as to avoid even the minimum requirement of hearing and could only be the result of some unexpected extraordinary situation e. g. floods etc. or of a nature where the scheme was a time bound one and by lapse of time the object of such scheme would become nugatory and infructuous. Strong reliance is placed on the following observations, in Motian v. State of Rajasthan (2) where it was observed as under: " In view of this, with due respect to the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the above case, I have got no hesitation in holding that the question regarding the urgency under S. 17 (4) (sic) of the Act, is not immune from judicial review and once it is challenged properly, this Court has ample jurisdiction to make limited probe into the matter as per limits set up by the Supreme Court in the above case. In fact, in the present bunch of cases, no probe even is required because the only requirement of acquisition to industrial development and that too for providing land first to the corporation (R. I. M. D. C.), which itself in terms would allot the land, later on, to industrialist and when the same is required to be done. Such a nature of requirement simplicitor without anything more live like time bound programme, can never be treated to enough for dispensing with and depriving a citizen of his legal right of a summery inquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. THIS is a sort of right of hearing, which has been put at the highest pedestal on the principles of natural justice, in the various cases of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayarma Shetty vs. The International Airport, Authority of India, AIR 1679 SC 1628 and Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597. I have got no hesitation in holding that invoking of urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Act was wholly misconceived and cannot be sustained" Reliance is also placed on Dora Phalauli vs. State of Punjab (3), The State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (4), Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India (5), Natwar Lal Jarambhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat (6) and Yasho Mathu Mahajan vs. The State of Maharashtra (7 ).