HANUMAN DAS AND OTHERS Vs. SANWAL RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have heard learned counsel for both the parties at length.

(2.) So far as the question of defaults in payment of rent is concerned, the learned District Judge has given the details regarding the payment of rent made from May, 1975 to July, 1976. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that the date in respect of money-order coupons, which have been considered by the learned District Judge, represented the date on which the money-orders were received back after refusal thereof. For the purposes of Section 13(1) and 19 A(3)(a) and 19 A(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the date of remitting the money-orders should be taken into consideration. Even if, for the sake of argument, the contention of learned counsel is accepted, it appears that at least the rents for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976, were admittedly neither paid nor tendered within the meaning of being remitted before the 15th of the next succeeding month. I am not expressing any opinion on the question as to whether the date of remitting the money-order or the date of refusal thereof, should be considered as the date of tender, but even if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, then also on account of non-payment or tender of rent for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976 within the specified time, it must be held that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for a period of six months, within the meaning of Section 13(1)(a) of the aforesaid Act, at the time of the institution of the suit.

(3.) Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that as the suit was filed on 13th of August, 1976, the default in payment of rent for the month of July, 1976 could not have been taken into consideration. I am unable to accept this submission. The rent for the month of July, 1976 became due on the expiry of that month and the same became payable as soon as it fell due. On account of Section 19A, in case the tenant makes payment of rent, in the absence of any contract by the 15th day of the next following month then such payment shall be deemed to have been made within time. Under sub-clause 4 of Section 19A, if rent is paid, remitted or deposited, by any of the methods specified in sub-section (3) of Section 19A, upto the 15th day of the next following month, then the tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent due from within time for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Now, his fiction of law is attracted only if rent is paid or tendered within the specified period viz. by the 15th of the next following month and not otherwise. It is the admitted position that rent for the month of July, 1976 was sent by money-order on 9th of September, 1976 vide Ex. A-22. Thus, the rent for the month of July, 1976 was neither paid nor remitted or deposited within the permissible period and as such, it cannot be deemed to have been paid or tendered within time, for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. The default in payment of rent occurred when the rent fell due and became payable by the tenant and thus six months rent had fallen due on the date of the institution of the suit. But the situation could have been remedied if payment or tender would have been made, in accordance with the provisions of Section 19A, within the period provided therein and in the manner prescribed in that section; or even the rent of July, 1976 would have been paid or remitted by money-order before 15th August, 1976. As the provisions of Section 19A were not complied with, so far as the payment of rent for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976 are concerned, the tenants should be considered to have committed defaults in payment of rent for a period of six months. Thus, even if the disputed remittances are not taken into consideration, the appellants cannot seek protection of the provisions of Section 13, because they had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from them for the period of six months, on the date of the institution of the suit.