NARASARAM Vs. BABLI BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the decree passed by Munsif, Bali in the present case was executable inasmuch as the court which passed the decree did not satisfy itself that one of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 (1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') existed. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kaushalva Devi v. V.K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 in support of his contention. It was held in the aforesaid case that in case the decree is passed on the basis of a compromise and did not indicate that any one of the statutory grounds contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act existed, then the decree should be considered to be a nullity, as the court had passed the decree without satisfying itself that a ground for eviction authorised by law existed.

(2.) The provisions of Section 13 (1) of the Act constitute a restriction on the right of the landlord to obtain a decree for eviction of his tenant in respect of premises situated in towns or cities to which the provisions of the Act are made applicable. Section 13 (1) forbids the court from passing a decree for eviction of a tenant, without satisfying itself that one of the ground contained therein exists. If the suit for eviction is not based on one of the grounds contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act or the court passing the decree does not apply its mind and satisfy itself about the existence of one of the permitted grounds for eviction, then the decree passed either on compromise or in default of payment of arrears of rent by the defendant, would be a nullity and could not be enforced by execution Thus, a decree which is not based on one of the grounds contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act, in so far as it directs delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord, is a nullity and cannot be executed.

(3.) The aforesaid principle is well settled and there could be no quarrel with the proposition of law urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Then the question which arises is as to whether in the present case the decree Ex. 4 was passed by the learned Munsif against the petitioner without satisfying himself as to the existence of one of the grounds contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner contends that after recording the statement of the plaintiff, the learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the plaintiff has been able to prove the case set up by him in the plaint and as such it should be considered from the averments contained in the plaint as to whether the suit was based on any one of the grounds contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act. In para 4 of the plaint, it has been mentioned that the defendant has paid the rent of the premises in dispute up to Jeth Badi 30 Samwat 2030 and that rent from Jeth Sud 1, Samwat 2030 has not been paid and is in arrears. It has also been pleaded that in this manner the defendant had become a defaulter in payment of rent and the plaintiff was entitled to get the defendant evicted from the suit premises on this ground. Again in para 7 of the plaint it has been stated that the defendant had not paid arrears of rent and as such he has become a defaulter and that the cause of action for filing the suit arose on that ground as well as on the ground of bona fide and personal necessity of the plaintiff for the suit premises.