G.D. CHADHA Vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision -petition submitted on behalf of Mr. G.D. Chadha against the charge -sheet framed by learned Special Judge, Bharatpur, on January 14, 1972. The prosecution allegation, in brief, is that when Mr. Chadha acted as District Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur from June 8, 1960 to July 7, 1962, he had accepted gratification other than legal remuneration from persons as detailed in Annexure 'A' for doing favour to them and thereby he committed offence under Section 161, I.P. G The prosecution allegation further is that Mr. Chadha habitually accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to accept from persons as detailed in Annexure 'A' for himself directly or through Kundan Lal and Hira Lal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward as mentioned in Section 161, I.P.C. and Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and thereby he committed an offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the said Act The prosecution also alleges that Mr. Chadha, while functioning as District Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur, habitually accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to accept for himself valuable things without consideration or for a consideration which he knew to be inadequate from persons who were officially connected with him, as detailed in Annexure 'A' and thereby committed criminal misconduct as defined in Section 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, punishable under Section 5(2) of the Act. On May 18, 1967, after the Anti -Corruption Department submitted a charge -sheet to the court of the Special Judge, Bharatpur. the learned Special Judge, Mr. Rajiv Amar Singh discharged the petitioner under Section 5(1)(a), read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He, however, ordered that be should be charged under Section 161, I.P.C. read with Sections 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.' lie also ordered that Hira Lal and Kundan Lal should be charged under Sections 162, 164 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Sections 114 or 109, IPG The aforesaid order was challenged before this Court by Mr. Chadha in Criminal Revision Petition No. 259 of 1967 & by the State of Rajasthan in Criminal Revision No. 295 of 1967. Both the revision applications were dismissed by this Court on May 21, 1970.

(2.) THE main grievance of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the trial court did not adjudicate upon his application marked Annexure 'B' before framing the charge -sheet. In that application it had been pointed out that the Anti -Corruption Department recorded self inculpatory and confessional statements of certain police officials even before the case was registered. Such statements were got signed by their makers. These statements were recorded contrary to the provisions of Section 161, Cr. P.C. The trial court ought to have ignored them and if those statements were to be ignored, there remained hardly any material on the record constituting prima facie case against him. Another point raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the alleged allegations against him are about 10 years old. It the case is remanded to the court below to frame a fresh charge -sheet, he would be subjected to undue harassment Learned Deputy Government Advocate submitted that when this Court has already taken a decision by its judgment, dated May, 21, 1970, it is not within its competence to give a fresh mandate. His further argument is that the allegations against the petitioners are serious in nature and, therefore, proceedings against the accused cannot be dropped at this stage.

(3.) SECTION 430, Cr. P.C. provides that judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. Section 430 in terms applies to judgments and orders passed by an appellate court. It has no application to decisions or orders made by the High Court in revision. The scope of Chapter XXXII relating to references and revisions has been enlarged by the addition of Sub -section (6) to Section 439, Cr. P.C. The scope of exception to Section 430 also stands enlarged so as to include within the exception whatever may come within Chapter XXXII. As has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in U.J.S. Chopra v. : 1955CriLJ1410 , cases coming within Chapter XXXII must stand free from the rule of finality embodied in Section 430, Cr. P.C. Section 369. Cr. P.C. provides that save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error. The very language of this section demonstrates that after announcing the judgment the court which pronounced it becomes functus officio. However, Section 369, is subject to other provisions of the Code and that section has to be read subject to Section 430, Cr. P.C. as the finality enshrined in Section 430, does not attach to the decisions or orders made in revision by reason of Chapter XXXII. The rules of finality embodied in Section 430, Cr. P.C. cannot affect the provisions provided in Chapter XXXII. That being the settled law, the petitioner is entitled to seek a fresh order from this Court under Chapter XXXII of the Code. The plea raised by learned Deputy Government Advocate is, therefore, devoid of substance.