SHIVRAJ SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a writ petition by Shivraj Singh under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner and one Ghasilal contested the election for the office of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Banetha, in Uniara tehsil of the Tonk district, and the petitioner came out successfully at the election. He assumed the office of Sarpanch on December 22, 1959 and continued to function as such upto December 8, 1960 on which date the Gram Panchayat ceased to exist. Six villages were taken out from the area of the Gram Panchayat so that a new Gram Panchayat, with the same name, was constituted and it consisted of Banetha and Sardarpura villages. Fresh elections to the reconstituted Banetha Gram Panchyat were held on December 9, 1960 and once again there was a contest between the petitioner and Ghasilal for the office of Sarpanch. The Petitioner defeated Ghasilal at the election and was declared elected on December 9, 1960. Even when the petitioner was functioning as Sarpanch, before his re-election, of the former Banetha Gram Panchayat, some complaints were made against him and charge-sheet Ex. 1 was issued by the Government against the petitioner which, in substance, amounted to an allegation that the petitioner had failed to discharge his duties under sec. 16 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act (Act XXI of 1953) hereinafter in this judgment referred to as the Act. By that charge-sheet, the petitioner was called upon to show why he should not be removed from the office of Sarpanch under sec. 17 (4) of the Act. The petitioner denied the charges. He however received an order dated January 13,1961 (Ex. P. 2) from the State Government suspending him from the office of Sarpanch under sec. 17 (4a) of the Act. The petitioner has challenged the validity of that order of suspension on the ground that it was not within the competence of the State Government to pass it.

(2.) THE aforesaid facts have not been controverted in the reply filed by the respondents and their main contention is that since an enquiry was already pending before the re-election of the petitioner and could be continued under the provisions of sec. 17 (4a) of the Act, a final order "will be passed in the light of the result of the enquiry" and that the order of suspension has been "passed only in the course of an enquiry and had already been given effect to". It has been denied that the order of suspension is invalid.