LAWS(RAJ)-1962-7-2

HARI NARAYAN Vs. BADRI DASS

Decided On July 30, 1962
HARI NARAYAN Appellant
V/S
BADRI DASS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a defendant tenant's second appeal in a suit for eviction and raises an interesting question as to the interpretation of Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1950 ). The question appears to be one of first impression so far as this Court is concerned.

(2.) IN order to bring out the points in controversy, the relevant facts leading up to this appeal are these. The defendant Harnarain admittedly took on rent the suit premises from the plaintiff Badridas at a monthly rental of Rs. 81/- under a registered rent-note from the 1st Dec, 1953, Ex. 1, the tenancy being for a fixed term of five years. One of the condition of this tenancy was that the tenant would pay rent every month under a receipt and another condition was that should the tenant fail to pay the rent for a period of three months in succession, the landlord would be entitled to have the premises vacated and to recover the rent for the remainder of the term of the tenancy. It is common ground between the parties that rent had been paid without any trouble upto the 31st October, 1957. Thereafter, according to the plaintiff, the defendant defaulted in the payment of rent for the period extending from the 1st November, 1957, upto the 30th November, 1958, that is, for a period of 13 months and he paid the rent for this period by a cheque dated 2nd December, 1958, for Rs. 1053/-which was accepted by the plaintiff. It is alleged that on the expiry of the term of the tenancy by efflux of time, the defendant was asked to hand over possession of the suit premises but he did not do so. The defendant is alleged to have defaulted in the payment of rent upto the 2nd May, 1959 as well. The plaintiff's case also was that the defendant had failed to pay house tax amounting to Rs. 145/2/- to the Municipal Council, Jaipur. Consequently, he instituted the present suit for the recovery of a sum Rs. 410/3/- as rent upto the 2nd May, 1959, and Rs. 145/2/- as house-tax and a further sum of Rs. 14/6/-as interest, in all amount-ting to Rs. 570/ -. The plaintiff also claimed the relief of ejectment on the ground that the defendant had committed more than three defaults of two months each during the period of 18 months next preceding the suit.

(3.) NOW, if the interpretation which learned counsel for the defendant seeks to put on clause (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 were to be accepted as correct, then this proviso would become meaningless. According to learned counsel, the default must continue upto the date of the suit, otherwise the landlord cannot sue for ejectment or, at any rate, no decree for ejectment can be passed against the tenant. If that is so, it would seem to be entirely futile and meaningless for the Legislature to introduce in S. 13 itself a proviso of the kind we have here. In the vast majority of suits based on tenancy, the tenancy has got to be terminated by a notice to quit before the suit can be filed, and as soon as such notice is given, all that the tenant has got to do is to pay the entire amount of rent which is in arrears and then contend with perfect immunity, nay impunity, that it cannot be said of him that he has neither paid nor tendered rent due from him for any two months at the date of the suit, and, therefore, the suit for ejectment must be dismissed against him. Such a result would be entirely destructive of the proviso to sub-sec. (4), and that, in my opinion, clinches the issue, and decisively negatives the correctness of the interpretation which learned counsel seeks to put on clause (a) of Sub-sec. (i) of S. 13. The more I think over the matter, the more convinced I feel that the correct interpretation of the provision in question is that it will immediately come into play where a tenant has not paid or tendered the entire amount of rent payable by him for any two months in succession at the due time, that is, at the point of time agreed to between the parties or in the absence thereof at the end of the unit of the tenancy and that it is not at all necessary on a plain construction of this provision that the tenant should be in default right upto the date of the suit, though I may add that where he is in such default, the clause would be certainly attracted into application.