STATE Vs. RAMKUMARI ALIAS RAMPYARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the State against the judgment of the City Magistrate, Jaipur, dated the 16th March, 1960, by which he acquitted the respondent accused Mst. Ramkumari alias Rampyari of an offence under S. 7 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (No. 104 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1956 ).

(2.) THE facts of the case lie in a very short compass. THE respondent was challaned in the court of City Magistrate, Jaipur, on the 25th November, 1958, as a result of which he charged the accused under sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Act of 1956. THE accused pleaded not guilty and so the court posted the case for production of the prosecution evidence. THEreafter the case was adjourned more than once and eventually on the 16th March, 1960, an objection was raised on behalf of the accused in the trial court that the investigation of the case was defective inasmuch as it had been made by a Circle Inspector. This objection was founded on S. 13 of the Act of 1956. THE relevant portion of that section reads as follows: - "13 (1) THEre shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that area. (2) THE special police officer shall not be below the rank of - (a) an Assistant Commissioner of police in the presidency towns of Madras Calcutta; (b) a Superintendent of Police in the pre sidency town of Bombay; and (c) a Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere". THE contention, therefore, was that the investigation which was made in this case by the Circle Inspector was illegal and it could only have been made by a police officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police specially appointed by the State for the purpose. This objection prevailed with the learned Magistrate and consequently he held that it was not possible to proceed with the case and he dropped it, and the Magistrate further thought that as the accused had already been charged, the only proper order that he could pass was of acquittal, and in that view of the matter he acquitted the accused. THE State now appeals against that order.