LAWS(RAJ)-1962-1-22

BANSHI DHAR Vs. GHISALAL

Decided On January 15, 1962
BANSHI DHAR Appellant
V/S
GHISALAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiff-appellant's application for the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents or the property which is the subject-matter of a purported simple mortgage during the pendency of the appeal before this Court.

(2.) Material facts leading to the present controversy are these. The defendants- respondents before us, on 19th September, 1950, secured a loan of Rs. 10,000/- from the plaintiff-appellant, mortgaged a property situate in Nasirabad and executed a registered deed. The mortgage was simple. The loan was to be repaid within two years and it bore interest at the rate of 12% per annum and in the event of there being a default in the payment of interest for three months the rate of interest to be charged was 15% per annum. The respondents only paid a sum of Rs. 1,200/- by way of interest on different dates and it appears that nothing was paid towards the principal. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted a suit for the sale of the mortgaged property. On the date of the suit the plaintiff- appellant's claim had reached the figure of Rs. 20,600/-, but he relinquisned Rs. 4,100/- and only claimed a relief for Rs. 16,500/-. During the pendency of the suit a receiver was appointed by the learned trial court who, it is said, collected a small sum of money. The suit was resisted by the defendants- respondents on various grounds. It was eventually dismissed because the trial court held that the document purported to be the mortgage deed was not duly attested and, therefore, no decree for sale could be granted. The relief for a personal decree, treating the deed as a registered bond, also could not be passed because such a remedy had become barred by time. Aggrieved by this dismissal of his suit the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. He has prayed that a receiver be appointed during the pendency of this appeal to collect the rents and profits of the property which is covered by the deed which forms the basis of the suit.

(3.) Two grounds have been urged for the appointment of a receiver by the appellant. Firstly, that on account of persistent default on the part of the defendants considerable interest has piled up on the loan advanced and secondly, the security has become and will increasingly become inadequate to meet the appellant's claim. The defendants-respondents have strongly resisted this request of the plaintiff-appellant. It is urged on their behalf that the relief for a personal decree being obviously barred by time the claim of the plaintiff- appellant rests only on the basis of a deed which is purported to be a simple mortgage. Therefore, what can possibly be claimed in a suit of this kind is the sale of the property alleged to be mortgaged and not its possession. No receiver can and should, therefore, be appointed in these circumstances.