LAWS(RAJ)-1952-4-22

LALCHAND Vs. STATE

Decided On April 09, 1952
LALCHAND Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by Lalchand who is being prosecuted in the Court of the First Assistant City Magistrate, Jaipur, for an offence under Section 6 read with Section 8, Jaipur Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1947, hereinafter to be referred to as the Jaipur Act, on the allegation that he exported certain iron girders from Jaipur West Railway Station to Pokaran in Marwar on 5-4-1949 in contravention of Section 5 (a) of the Iron and Steel Control (Production and Distribution) Order of 1947, hereinafter to be referred to as the Jaipur Order. One Nanulal was also challaned along with him but he was discharged by the learned Magistrate. Lalchand has come in revision to this Court and the following two points are raised on his behalf:

(2.) Taking up the first ground first, which, to our mind, is in fact the most important ground in the case, it was argued by the learned counsel on behalf of the accused that by Section 20 (1) of the Rajasthan Ordinance the Jaipur Act was repealed. There is no provision in the Rajasthan Ordinance by which prosecutions launched under the Jaipur Order could be saved. It was argued that Section 6, General Clauses Act does not apply to the present case as the General Clauses Act was not in force in Rajasthan at the time when the Rajasthan Ordinance was promulgated. It was further argued that even if it be taken that the Central General Clauses Act applied to Rajasthan (which in fact did not apply), Section 6 would not apply all the" same, because it applies only to the cases where a former Act is Simply repealed and another one substituted in its place. For this reliance was placed upon two rulings of the Allahabad High Court one reported in -- 'Firm Danmal Parshotamdas v. Firm Baburam Chhotelal', AIR 1936 All 3 (A), and the other In -- 'Benares Bank Ltd v. Sri Prakasha'. AIR 1946 All 269 (B). In the first of these two rulings there are following observations of Suleman C. J. from which it was inferred that S. 6 (e), General Clauses Act applies to those cases only where a previous law has been simply repealed and there is no fresh legislation to take its place:

(3.) That was the only provision which related to saving and it did not save any action taken under any of the repealed Acts and therefore the present prosecution which was launched under the Jaipur Act could not be saved.